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Abstract
My dissertation chapters study carriers’ pricing and subcontracting strategies in the U.S.
airline industry. The first chapter is a joint paper with my advisor Dr. Qihong Liu and
committee member Dr. Myongjin Kim. It focuses on the impact of airlines’ baggage fee. In
2010, Spirit airlines announced that it would start charging passengers for carry-on baggage.
Using a vector of route level characteristics, we construct a matched group consisting of
routes which best match those served by Spirit (treated group). We then run a diff-in-diff
estimation using the treated and matched group, and examine the impact of Spirit’s baggage
fee policy on its rivals’ ticket prices. Our results show that Spirit’s rivals reduce their prices by
about 5.8% after Spirit charges carry-on baggage fee. Looking into potentially heterogeneous
impacts, we find that the policy impact is smaller on low-cost carriers relative to legacy
carriers. We also take into account subcontracting status. Relative to non-subcontracting
carriers, those which subcontract operations to regional carriers reduce their prices further
by more than 10%, including average price (linear or log) and various points on the price
distribution. We also discuss how the significant price reduction on subcontracting routes
may negatively impact regional carriers.
Chapter 2 is a joint paper with my co-advisor Dr. Georgia Kosmopoulou. In this paper,
xi
we use Bayesian estimation to study subcontracting network formation and pricing decisions
in the US airline industry. We find that, a major carrier is more likely to enter a route in sub-
contracting services if its rivals have already subcontracted while regional carriers prefer to
avoid competition. For existing major carriers per-route, self-service and use of subsidiaries
are complementary to subcontracting, while code-sharing is a substitute. Carrier similarity
and previously formed networks have significant impacts on new network formations. Tak-
ing potential endogeneity issues into account, we find that major carriers’ subcontracting
behaviors decrease ticket prices by 3.4%.
The third chapter takes an approach of duopolistic third-degree price discrimination
with homogeneous product to understand airlines’ carry-on baggage fee decisions, with the
assumption of firms competing in price with precommitment of quantities. In the theoretical
model, two firms compete in both the high-end market (carry-on passengers) and the low-end
market (non-carry-on passengers). A firm may use add-on pricing as a tool to distinguish
passengers across markets and charge separate prices. The theoretical results suggest that
the adoption of a carry-on baggage fee is caused by the decrease in the willingness to pays
or the fraction of non-carry-on passengers, which can be reflected by the decrease in the
skewness of airline ticket price distribution. With panel regression and survival analysis, I
find a negative relationship between price skewness and the adoption of carry-on baggage
fee and provide some evidence supporting the theoretical results. The intuition behind these
findings is also provided.
xii
Chapter 1
Carry-on Baggage Fee, Airline Pricing
and Subcontracting
1.1 Introduction
In recent years the U.S. airline industry has experienced a significant increase in unbundling
where charging all-inclusive ticket prices are replaced by a business model of lower basic
prices plus additional fees for add-ons. Examples include baggage fees, premium seats up-
grade etc. Airlines have also found new sources of revenue from services such as Wi-Fi and
Entertainment. Most major airlines started charging for checked bags in 2008, and in 2017
United and American started selling Basic Economy fares for which travelers cannot bring a
carry-on baggage or pick a seat and so on for free. Our paper investigates the impacts of a
specific unbundling strategy, namely Spirit’s decision to charge for carry-on baggage. This
refers to the baggage which travelers put in the overhead bin, as opposed to under the seat
in front.
1
In April 2010, Spirit announced that it would charge travelers $20 to $45 for items they
place in the overhead bins.1 Spirit Airlines was the first carrier to charge for carry-on baggage,
and was the only one doing so during our sample period. Other Ultra-Low-Cost carriers like
Frontier and Allegiant followed Spirit’s step in 2012 and 2014 respectively. More recently,
legacy carriers also started offering Basic Economy fares, which put restrictions on carry-on
baggage among other things. This behavior change by the legacy carriers would impact a
much larger set of markets and travelers. While further research is needed, understanding
the impact of Spirit’s carry-on baggage fee helps provide insights on legacy carriers’ behavior
change and the corresponding impacts.2
We also believe Spirit’s policy change offers a few advantages over legacy carriers’ in terms
of identifying the true policy impact. Spirit was the only airline adopting the baggage fee
policy in our study, and the fee applies to all markets it serves. These make the treatment,
and the treated/control group distinction easy to identify. In contrast, legacy carriers’ basic
economy fares impose constraints beyond just carry-on baggage fee (e.g., seat selection,
boarding group) so the exact treatment is less clear. In addition, several legacy carriers
started offering basic economy fares around the same time, and roll out basic economy class
fares selectively across routes.3
1The exact cost depends on whether passengers are members of the airline’s ultra-low fare club and
whether travelers pay for carry-on baggage in advance. See “Airline to charge for carry-on bags,” CNN,
April 6, 2010.
2Based on Spirit’s 2012 earnings statement, 40% of its revenue comes from ancillary fees which include
baggage fees. See “Spirit Air to charge up to $100 for carry-on bags,” CNN Money, May 3, 2012. Also,
Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2017) reports that the total baggage fee (including checked and carry-
on) revenue of U.S airlines reached 4.2 billion dollars in 2016.
3Route selection is itself an interesting question. For example, which airlines started offering basic
2
In this paper, we investigate the impacts of Spirit’s carry-on baggage fee and answer the
following questions: (1) What are the effects of carry-on baggage fee on competing carriers’
ticket prices? (2) Do carriers’ responses vary depending on their type (e.g., legacy carriers)
or subcontracting status?
We first offer some conjectures on the two questions above. After unbundling, Spirit’s
basic ticket quality (and cost) goes down because it does not allow travelers to bring carry-
on baggage anymore. Moreover, Spirit would have an incentive to lower basic ticket prices
to attract more passengers, which in turn leads to more opportunities to collect carry-on
baggage fees. Combined, one would thus expect Spirit’s basic ticket fares to go down. The
impact of the policy on Spirit’s rivals is more subtle. On one hand, facing lower prices from
Spirit, its rivals may need to reduce their prices as well to stay competitive. On the other
hand, since Spirit charges for carry-on baggage but its rivals do not, one may expect travelers
to make adjustment. In particular, travelers with (without) carry-on bags are more (less)
likely to fly with Spirit’s rivals. This raises Spirit’s rivals’ cost of serving their travelers so
they should raise prices. With two opposite effects, the overall impact of Spirit’s baggage
fee policy on its rivals’ prices is ambiguous and remains an empirical question.
But what role does subcontracting status play in determining how Spirit’s rivals respond
to the policy? A typical contract for subcontracting can be one of two types, depending on
how the revenue from ticket sales is split between the major and regional carriers (see Forbes
and Lederman (2013) for more details). In a fixed payment contract, the major carrier pays
the regional carrier a fixed amount (to purchase certain amount of capacity at agreed rate)
economy class first, and on what routes? Do different airlines roll out around the same time or is there a
leader-follower pattern?
3
and keeps all the revenue. In contrast, in a revenue-sharing contract, the ticket revenue from
the subcontracted route is split between the major and regional carriers. In both types of
contracts, the major carriers set flight schedule and airfare, and sell tickets to customers.
The regional carriers operate the flights using their own crew and aircrafts, and bear most,
if not all of the operation costs. When Spirit charges baggage fee, it lowers its basic fare but
the all-inclusive fare (including baggage fee) goes up. At the margin, passengers without
carry-on baggage will switch to Spirit, while passengers with carry-on baggages will switch
to major carriers. Both raise Spirit’s rivals’ costs. This has no impact on subcontracting
major carriers since the cost is borne by regional carriers. However, non-subcontracting
major carriers take operating cost into account, and higher cost would lead to higher ticket
prices. As a result, price reduction is less for non-subcontracting major carriers relative to
subcontracting ones.4
To test these conjectures, we rely on difference-in-difference estimation. The treated
group includes markets where Spirit operates, while the control group consists of routes
where Spirit does not operate. One would expect that Spirit likely chooses to operate in
specific markets, and such selection makes the control group not a good comparison group
for the treated group. Using a set of route-level characteristics, we construct a matched
group – a subset of routes within the control group which best match the routes in the
treated group. The treated group and matched group are shown to have common trend,
which allows us to run diff-in-diff estimation. The estimation results show that in response
4Subcontracting major carriers may also have an incentive to reduce price further when passengers’
itineraries involve connecting flights where parts of the flight itineraries are operated by major carriers and
others are operated by regionals. This won’t appear in our data though, since we only consider nonstop
flights.
4
to Spirit’s carry-on baggage fee, its rivals lower their prices by about 5.8% or $10. We also
explore the impact of baggage fee policy on different points of the price distribution. The
effects are all negative, but significant only at the 20th- and 50th- (not the 80th-) percentile
of the price distribution. The impact on the median prices is the largest (decrease by 7.3%).
One may think that the baggage fee policy may vary with the type of carriers, for example,
legacy carriers vs. low-cost carriers (LCCs). This is confirmed by our results. The overall
impact is mostly driven by legacy carriers, as LCCs hold their prices steady after Spirit’s
baggage fee policy.
We then investigate whether an airline’s response to Spirit’s baggage fee policy depends on
its subcontracting status. Technical breakthrough in the early 2000s led to the development
of small yet cost effective jet aircrafts. This greatly helped regional airlines which usually
operate aircrafts with less than 90 seats. Major carriers quickly learned that on some low
density routes, instead of operating their own flights, if they subcontract the operations to
regional airlines, they can improve cost effectiveness. Subcontracting became popular and
rapid expansion of regional carriers soon followed. According to the official Regional Airline
Association report, in 2007 regional carriers provide services to nearly two-thirds of airports,
and operate in about 42% of all departures in domestic routes. If we only consider the routes
served by at least one regional airline, regionals’ roles are a lot more prominent – 95% of
departures on these routes are operated by regional airlines.
The popularity of subcontracting by major carriers in the U.S. airline industry has gar-
nered much attention among scholars recently. The focus has been on when the major carriers
subcontract routes to regional carriers (Forbes and Lederman (2009) and Tan (2018)), as
well as the choice between independent regionals and subsidiaries. Little attention has been
5
given to how subcontracting affects major carriers’ pricing behavior. In our setting, Spirit’s
carry-on baggage fee policy affects major carriers that it competes with, and these major car-
riers may or may not subcontract. This distinction allows us to look at how major carriers’
responses to the baggage fee policy vary depending on their subcontracting status, and gives
a sneak peak into the impacts of subcontracting on major carrier’s pricing strategies. To this
end, we divide the treated group (Spirit markets) and control group (non-Spirit markets)
further into subcontracting and non-subcontracting subgroups depending on whether the
carrier subcontracts operations in the market. We then run a triple-difference estimation,
and the triple interaction term tells us the differential impact of baggage fee on major car-
rier’s prices depending on their subcontracting status. Our results show that among Spirit’s
rivals, subcontracting carriers reduce their ticket prices more than non-subcontracting car-
riers, by about 10.6%.5 The impact is particularly strong and significant for median prices -
the difference in price reduction is 16.5%.6 After controlling for subcontracting status, price
reduction for carriers which do not subcontract is much smaller and the estimates become
mostly insignificant.
Our paper contributes to the empirical price unbundling literature. While the theory
5On routes which some major carriers subcontract, we drop major carriers which operate on the same
route but do not subcontract. These non-subcontracting carriers compete with subcontracting carriers and
thus are not immune to the impact of subcontracting status. Therefore, we are comparing subcontracting
carriers (on subcontracting routes) with non-subcontracting carriers (on non-subcontracting routes).
6Caution is needed when interpreting our results on subcontracting. The relative short time periods of
our sample allows us to treat subcontracting status as exogenous. Over a longer period, major and regional
carriers make decisions on whether or not enter into partnership and if yes, the exact contract terms. As
a result, subcontracting status will be endogenous, and can be impacted by Spirit’s baggage fee, possibly
through its impact on ticket prices.
6
literature on bundling/unbundling is extensive, empirical studies have been scarce, especially
those studying the U.S. airline industry. Our paper adds to the few studies that empirically
look at how checked bag fees and additional services (e.g., inflight wi-fi) affect ticket prices.
We do so by looking at the impact of carry-on bag fee by one airline on its rivals’ ticket prices.
Consistent with Brueckner et al. (2015), we find that unbundling leads to reduction in own
basic prices but increase in all-inclusive prices (price plus carry-on baggage fee). We also
investigate the impact on Spirit rival’s prices, and find results opposite to existing studies.
For example, Zou et al. (2017) find that checked bag fees by legacy carriers raised the prices
of their rivals’ (Southwest and JetBlue which do not charge for checked bags). In contrast,
we find that carry-on baggage fee by Spirit leads to lower ticket prices by its rivals (which
do not charge for carry-on baggage fee). Our paper also contributes to the nascent literature
on subcontracting in the U.S. airline industry. We show that when an airline competes with
Spirit on a route, its subcontracting status is a significant predictor of how its ticket prices
will respond to Spirit’s carry-on baggage fee. Carriers which subcontract to regional carriers
will see a significantly larger price reduction after Spirit charges for carry-on baggage.
Our results have important policy implications. First, Spirit’s baggage fee leads to lower
basic ticket prices for not only Spirit but also its rivals. Since Spirit’s rivals do not charge for
baggage fee, their customers are unambiguously better off. However, caution is warranted
for consumers who still fly with Spirit but bring with them carry-on baggages, often unaware
of the carry-on baggage fee. The reduction in Spirit’s ticket prices is insufficient to offset the
carry-on baggage fee, especially if travelers fail to pay for it in advance, and have to pay at
the gate instead. In light of this, it is important for consumers to be well informed of the
7
baggage fee policy, and understand the terms of their tickets.7 From competition perspective,
requirement on proper disclosure of add-on pricing needs to be in place so consumers can
compare the total prices across different airlines. This is especially true for items such as
carry-on baggage fee which used to be taken for granted as complimentary, and the exact
pricing may not be uniform across carriers or time.8
Second, our results suggest that regulators need to take a closer look at the relationship
between major and regional carriers. While regionals are responsible for the operation costs,
ticket pricing decisions are made by major carriers. When a demand or supply side shock
takes place in the subcontracted routes, operation costs may not be a main factor entering
into major carriers’ pricing decisions which can then negatively affect the regional carriers. In
the case where the major and regional carriers share revenue from the operations, a significant
price reduction by the major carriers obviously hurts the regional carriers. But even in the
case of fixed-price contracts, lower price is likely to be accompanied by higher passenger
numbers which increases the regional carriers’ costs. In addition, Spirit’s baggage fee likely
will shift the allocation of travelers across carriers and increase the regional carriers’ costs.
Those without carry-on baggage may find Spirit more attractive while travelers with carry-
on baggage have more incentive to shift to Spirit’s competitors because they do not charge
for carry-on baggage. This would also raise regional carriers’ costs for which they won’t
7Spirit’s passengers are often surprised when they find, at the gate, that they have to pay for
carry-on baggage fee. This is one of the most common complaints of Spirit. See, for example,
https://www.consumeraffairs.com/travel/spirit.html, accessed on April 28, 2018.
8American Airlines initially charged fee for carry-on baggage for its Basic Economy fares but then
reversed policy in July 2018. See “American Airlines basic economy tickets allow free carry-ons,” USA
Today, July 26, 2018. In contrast, United still charges carry-on baggage fee for its Basic Economy fares.
https://www.united.com/web/en-US/content/travel/inflight/basic-economy.aspx, accessed in April 2019.
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be compensated by the fixed-price contracts. Regional carriers provide important services,
especially in medium to small distance markets. Industry consolidation has significantly
reduced the number of major airlines and shifted bargaining power further away from regional
airlines toward the major airlines.
1.1.1 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature looking at competition and pricing in the airline industry.9
For example Borenstein and Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), Dai, Liu and Serfes
(2014) and Kim and Shen (2017), analyze the relationship between competition and price
dispersion. Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) analyze how entry affects incumbents’ prices, while
Kim and Singal (1993) studies the impacts of merger. Our paper shows that controlling for
competition, adopting a carry-on baggage fee leads to price reductions of incumbents across
the board.
There is a fast growing literature which studies the impacts of price unbundling in the
airline industry, usually focusing on checked bag fee.10 Within this literature, our paper is
most closely related to Brueckner et al. (2015) who analyze how airlines’ checked baggage
fee affects their ticket prices. They develop a theory model which predicts that basic ticket
price would go down after unbundling, but the full-trip price (fare plus bag fee) may go up
or down. Their empirical findings confirm that when airlines charge for checked baggage
9Besides competition, Sengupta and Wiggins (2014) use a unique dataset and study the impact of online
airline ticket purchasing on prices.
10Exceptions include Kim, Liu and Rupp (2018) who investigate the provision of in-flight amenities across
flights and see how they affect basic ticket prices. Nicolae et al. (2017) study the relationship between checked
baggage fee and on-time performance.
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fee, their own basic ticket prices go down. However, the all-inclusive prices (ticket price
plus bag fee) go up because the ticket price reduction is insufficient to compensate for the
checked bag fee. Similar to Brueckner et al. (2015), Kim, Liu and Rupp (2018) also look at
add-on services, in particular, in-flight amenities such as in-flight wi-fi, in-seat power etc.11
Using self-collected data, they show that carriers provide significantly higher product quality
(Wi-Fi, entertainment, and power) on more competitive routes. They also find that having
Wi-Fi and entertainment lead to significantly lower basic ticket prices. Zou et al. (2017)
show that charging checked baggage fee has positive effect on competing carriers which do
not charge checked baggage fee (Southwest and JetBlue).
Our paper differs from these studies in several important aspects. First, while they study
checked baggage fee, we analyze carry-on baggage fee which is relatively new and hard for
travelers to avoid. Second, the fact that only Spirit charges for carry-on baggage and that
Spirit only operates in some markets allow us to use a difference-in-difference estimation to
better identify the impacts of the baggage fee policy. We focus on the impacts of Spirit’s
baggage fee policy, not on its own prices, but on its rivals’ prices. Also, we include all
Spirit’s rivals whereas in Zou et al. (2017), the rivals are restricted to Southwest and JetBlue
since most other rivals also charged for checked baggage. Lastly, we also explore the policy’s
differential impacts on different points of the price distribution or different types of carriers
depending on their subcontracting status.
Beyond airline industry, there is a general literature on price unbundling and add-on
11They interpret in-flight amenities as quality and explore how competition affects quality provision – a
topic which has generated increasing attention in recent years (see, for example, Prince and Simon (2014,
2017)).
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pricing, covering both monopoly and competition.12 Fruchter, Gerstner and Dobson (2011)
consider monopoly and they are mainly concerned with whether and how the monopolist
should charge for add-ons. In a duopoly setting, Ellison (2005), Gabaix and Laibson (2006),
Dahremo¨ller (2013), and Shulman and Geng (2013) analyze how firms price add-ons when
some consumers are unaware of the add-on fees. Other research such as Shugan et al. (2017a)
and Lin (2017) explains why firms price add-on in some industries but not others. Note that
these studies generally assume that all firms choose price unbundling, and do not consider
the case of unilateral adoption where only one firm chooses price unbundling.
Our paper is also closely related to the literature on subcontracting in the airline indus-
try.13 Forbes and Lederman (2009), the seminal work in the airline subcontracting literature,
investigates when carriers use their own regionals vs. independent regionals. Tan (2018)
shows that major carriers are more likely to outsource (and also charge lower ticket prices)
on routes with stronger competition. Shi (2016) studies what factors determine carriers’ sub-
contracting behavior, and provides evidence that carriers with and without subcontracting
have different responses to market entry. We investigate whether carriers with subcontract-
ing behavior respond to carry-on baggage fee differently from carriers without subcontracting
behavior. Studying their differential responses to baggage fee can help us better understand
how subcontracting affects the way airlines compete with each other and the corresponding
welfare implications. In this aspect, our paper is the first one to estimate how subcontracting
12The unbundling literature usually considers only competition between two firms, likely for convenience
of analysis. Zhou (2017) analyzes competitive bundling and shows that the welfare implications can reverse
when number of firms increases from 2 to more than 2.
13Two different terms, subcontracting and outsourcing have been used for the same behavior. For example,
Forbes and Lederman (2009) uses “subcontracting” while Tan (2018) uses “outsourcing”.
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status affects a carrier’s response to price unbundling by its rival.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variable
construction. We discuss the estimation method in Section 3, and present the empirical
results in Section 4. Section 5 includes several robustness checks and we conclude in Section
6.
1.2 Data and Variable
The main data set is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data, a quarterly
survey of 10% domestic airline tickets sold to passengers. The data includes information such
as time (year-quarter), carrier, ticket price, number of passengers and origin and destination
airport. Ticket price is the basic fare without add-ons (e.g., bag fee). The number of
passengers indicates how many passengers bought their tickets at the given price. We focus
on non-stop routes and define a market as a directional nonstop airport-to-airport route.
That is, the route from SFO to LAX is a different market from LAX to SFO. The data
is then aggregated to carrier-route-quarter level. For example, an observation in our data
can be that American Airlines transported 11,675 passengers from New York LaGuardia
to Chicago O’Hare in the 3rd quarter of 2010, with average ticket price of $206.6. Spirit’s
policy (charging $20 for carry-on baggage) took effect in August 2010. We restrict ourselves
to the periods from 2009 first quarter to 2011 fourth quarter. We choose this time span to
maximize the number of time periods yet avoid known confounding factors.
To solve the potential endogeneity problem raised by one of the key control variables
(market competition level or HHI), we use instrumental variables. We instrument HHI
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because we want to interpret the competition effects in addition to the policy treatment
effects that is our main interest. Following the literature, many of our instruments are con-
structed based upon enplanement. The enplanement is the number of passengers boarded
on flights between two airports, which are not necessarily the origin or destination of pas-
sengers’ itineraries (due to connecting flights). The T-100 Domestic Segment Data reports
enplanement directly, but we do not use this enplanement data for the following reason.
DB1B data set reports both ticketing carrier and operating carrier. Ticketing and operating
carriers may differ for a given itinerary because the ticketing carrier subcontracts the service
to the operating carrier or two carriers may have code sharing agreements. We use ticketing
carrier to study carriers’ pricing behavior in this paper because it is the carrier who sells
tickets and decides on ticket prices. On the other hand, the carrier reported by T-100 data
is commonly recognized as operating carrier. One can merge DB1B data and T-100 data by
operating carrier, but they cannot be matched perfectly and consequently some observations
will be dropped. To avoid this problem, we use DB1B data to approximate enplanement
(more details are provided in the Appendix). Following the literature, we also construct
instrumental variables using the population estimates provided in the Metropolitan and Mi-
cropolitan Statistical Areas Population data.
We also filter our data as follows. Since our focus is on Spirit rival’s behavior, our treated
group includes only routes where Spirit and at least one other airline operate in each period of
our sample. Relatedly, the control group includes routes where at least two carriers operate
yet Spirit never operates in each period of the sample. We end up with a balanced panel
of 938 directional non-stop routes, 12 quarters and a total of 28,238 observations (at the
carrier-route-quarter level). Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of the total sample as
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well as for Spirit and non-Spirit routes separately. We can see that there is a large amount
of variations in ticket prices as well as market competition levels (HHI). About a third of
the observations involve subcontracting behavior.
1.3 Estimation Method
We are interested in exploring the impacts of Spirit airlines’ baggage fee policy, in particular,
how the policy affects ticket prices. Spirit only operates in a few selected routes (markets)
and we would expect the policy to have impact in these routes but not in others. This
distinction naturally calls for a difference-in-difference (diff-in-diff) method which we will
carry out. However, there are several problems which need to be fixed. Let Spirit markets
be the markets which Spirit operates in and let Non-Spirit markets denote the other markets.
The former (latter) is the treated (control) group.
The first problem concerns the treated group. Spirit makes baggage fee policy decision
and price decision simultaneously, so the policy is endogenous to Spirit’s own prices. To
avoid this problem, we analyze the impact of policy on Spirit rivals’ prices, not on Spirit’s
own prices. Recall that our treated group includes only routes where Spirit and at least
one other airline operate during each of our sample periods. Spirit’s baggage fee policy,
which applies to all Spirit markets, can be considered exogenous to competing carriers in
any given Spirit market, as is commonly assumed in the literature (See, for example, Prince
and Simon (2017)). Under this assumption, our treated group includes all carriers except
Spirit in markets which Spirit operates.
The second problem concerns the comparability of the treated and control group. Spirit
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likely enters into routes selectively, implying that Spirit markets and non-Spirit markets may
have systematic differences.14 This difference may violate the common trend assumption
which is critical for diff-in-diff estimation. To fix this problem, we do not use the whole
control group, but rather construct a subsample of routes in the control group that best
mimic the treated group. Since the selection (matching) is done at the route-level, we employ
route level variables for matching, using data in the last quarter before Spirit’s baggage fee
policy change. These variables include distance, smaller and larger population of the two end
cities, each of the top 3 carriers’ market shares, passenger number, enplanement, a low-cost
carrier dummy indicating whether a low-cost carrier operates on the route, and average fare.
For each route in the treated group, we select top 5 routes in the control group with the
minimal metric distances on these vector of variables. In particular, let (v1, · · · , vN) denote
the N variables used for matching. We first calculate the sample variance of each variable
(vn) across routes in the treated group: var
T
n . Then, for any pair of routes consisting of route
m in the treated group and route k in the control group, we calculate the metric distance:
MDmk =
√∑N
n=1
(vTnm−vCnk)2
varTn
. For each route in the treated group, we pick the 5 routes in the
control group with the smallest metric distance. We then combine all the matched routes
and drop repetitions in the event that a route in the control group may be in the top 5
matches for multiple routes in the treated group.
To illustrate the outcome of matching, we report the mean of these matching variables
for the treated, control and matched group respectively in Table 1.2. By design, the matched
group would match better with the treated group, which can be seen from the table.
14This can also be seen in Table 1.1 by comparing the summary stats for Spirit markets and Non-Spirit
markets.
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Difference-in-difference Estimation
As is common in diff-in-diff analysis, we introduce two dummy variables: SptMktj and
Policyt. SptMktj = 1 if and only if Spirit operates on route j (both before and after
treatment). Policyt = 1 if and only if the time period is after treatment (both treated and
matched group). We then construct the interaction term, SptMktj × Policyt and use it as
an explanatory variable. The econometric model we estimate is,
Yijt = α0 + α1 × SptMktj × Policyt + δXijt + γij + θt + εijt, (1.1)
where γij and θt capture carrier-route and time fixed effects respectively, and Xijt include
route level and carrier-route level controls such as HHI, Merger dummies etc. Because
we control for time and route-carrier fixed effects, the stand-alone Policyt and SptMktj are
absorbed so only its interaction term shows up in the right hand side of the equation.
Several measures of fares are used as dependent variable Yijt. The baseline is the log
of average fare. We also consider different parts of the fare distribution, in particular, log
of the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentile prices. While using log of fares helps us interpret
the estimates as percentage changes, we also use average fare (i.e., without taking the log)
as dependent variable and the corresponding estimate suggests level changes (as opposed
to percentage changes) in prices. Our focus is on the interaction term which captures the
diff-in-diff estimate.
Triple-difference Estimation
The diff-in-diff estimates above report the policy impacts on all carriers. Next, we want
to distinguish different carriers and explore whether the policy has heterogeneous impacts
16
across different types of carriers. In particular, we consider whether the carrier (1) is a legacy
carrier or an LCC; (2) subcontracts operations to regional carriers in a given market.
Legacy carriers vs. LCCs: The difference between legacy carriers and low-cost carriers
has been narrowing. Studying their responses to Spirit’s carry-on baggage fee policy offers
an opportunity to discover whether there is any difference in legacy carriers’ and LCCs’
pricing strategies. To achieve this goal, we first define a dummy variable LCCi which takes
value 1 if carrier i is an LCC and 0 otherwise.15 Next, we consider the following econometric
model,
Yijt = α0 + α1 × SptMktj × Policyt + α2 × Policyt × LCCi
+ α3 × SptMktj × Policyt × LCCi + [δXijt + γij + θt] + εijt. (1.2)
Note that the stand-alone terms of Policyt, SptMktj, LCCi and SptMktj × LCCi are
absorbed by the time and carrier-route fixed effects respectively. Our variable of interest is
the triple interaction term SptMktj ×Policyt×LCCi. Similar to Diff-in-diff, we use several
measures of fares (average vs. percentile; with and without taking log).
Subcontracting status: We also want to study whether carriers respond to Spirit’s baggage
fee policy differently depending on their subcontracting status. Often times a (major) carrier
may sell tickets to travelers while the actual flight is operated by another carrier. We are
not considering code-sharing between major airlines. Rather, we focus on the case where a
major airline subcontracts the flight operations to a regional carrier on a route.
We define a variable Subcontractingij (for carrier i at route j) which takes value 1 if
15All ticketing carriers in our sample are either legacy carriers or LCCs.
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carrier i subcontracts its operations to a regional carrier on route j for over 25% of all its
pre-treatment periods (before Spirit’s baggage fee policy). Note that subcontracting status is
defined at the ij level, because it is possible that some major carriers subcontract while others
do not on the same route. Moreover, subcontracting status does not vary with t, because
we take a holistic view and define it by aggregating over all pre-treatment periods for a
given carrier-route combination. If we expect subcontracting carriers to respond differently,
it would also indirectly affect the non-subcontracting carriers on the same market. To avoid
this contamination, we drop the observations from the non-subcontracting carriers on routes
which at least some carriers subcontract.16 Note that a major carrier may rely a combination
of operating its own flights and subcontracting to a regional carrier on the same route.
Price responses have very different implications for the major carriers depending on their
subcontracting status. When a major carrier is both the ticketing and operating carrier, it
earns all ticket revenue and pays all costs. In contrast, when a major carrier subcontracts
its operations to a regional carrier, it enjoys most or all of the ticket revenue, yet pays only
part of the operation cost beyond the fixed cost it pays to the regional carrier. Since at least
some operation cost does not enter into the major carriers’ objective function, subcontracting
major carriers have extra incentives to reduce prices when facing lower prices from Spirit,
so as to remain competitive and retain their market share in the subcontracted routes.
To investigate how a carrier’s price response (to Spirit’s policy) varies depending on its
16Including those non-subcontracting carriers on subcontracting routes does not affect our estimation
results. Dropping those carriers provides a cleaner identification.
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subcontracting status in a market, we consider the following econometric model,
Yijt = α0 + α1 × SptMktj × Policyt + α2 × Policyt × Subcontractingij
+ α3 × SptMktj × Policyt × Subcontractingij + δXijt + γij + θt + εijt. (1.3)
Note that the stand-alone terms of Policyt, SptMktj, Subcontractingij and SptMktj ×
Subcontractingij are absorbed by the time and carrier-route fixed effects respectively. Our
variable of interest is the triple interaction term SptMkt× Policy × Subcontracting.
1.4 Estimating the effects of Spirit’s carry-on baggage
fee
A key assumption for diff-in-diff estimation to be valid is that the treated and control group
have common trend pre-treatment. We thus test for common trend using the treated group
and matched group. The results are reported in Table 1.3. Coefficient for the interaction
term SptMktj × TimeTrend is insignificant in all models, suggesting that the two groups
have common trend.17
17We also use time dummies for each period before the policy change, and interact these time dummies
(instead of the variable TimeTrend) with SptMktj . The interaction terms remain insignificant, suggesting
that the treated and matched groups have common trend.
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1.4.1 Effect on Spirit’s own ticket prices
Charging a fee for carry-on baggage is a form of unbundling. It is intuitive that Spirit’s base
ticket price will go down but the inclusive ticket price (including carry-on baggage fee) will
go up after the policy change.18 To see whether this is the case, we compare Spirit’s own
prices before and after policy change, using the following econometric model.
Yjt = α0 + α1 × Policyt + δXijt + λj + ujt (1.4)
Our variable of interest is Policyt, which captures the change of Spirit’s prices before and
after the policy. We do not claim this as a causal effect because the policy is endogenous
to Spirit’s own prices. Moreover, we cannot control for time fixed effects. The results are
presented in Table 1.4. We can see that Spirit’s own prices experience a reduction, which are
significant at the 20- and 50-percentiles but not at the 80th-percentile. The average fare goes
down by about 4.4% (column (1) or $5.3 (column (5)), but neither is significant. Adding the
carry-on baggage fee (say $20), however, the all-inclusive ticket price will go up, consistent
with our intuition and with empirical findings in Brueckner et al. (2015).
1.4.2 Effect on Spirit rivals’ ticket prices
Before we run regressions using the econometric model in (1.1), we first present some simple
evidence to illustrate the policy impact on Spirit rivals’ prices. Figure 1.1 plots the prices
at two markets in our sample: a Spirit market (from Detroit to Orlando) and a Non-Spirit
18Brueckner et al. (2015) provides evidence that price unbundling decreases the carrier’s own ticket price
but increases the full price for passengers bringing a checked baggage.
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market (from Buffalo to Orlando). The vertical line illustrates when Spirit starts charging
carry-on baggage fee. This baggage fee policy became effective on August 1, 2010, covering
2 out of 3 months for the 3rd quarter of 2010. From the figure, we can see that the two
markets generally follow the same trend pre-treatment. However, immediately after the
policy change, the two markets diverge: the non-Spirit market sees a price increase while
the Spirit market experiences a significant price drop. This figure provides a preliminary
evidence that Spirit’s carry-on baggage fee policy has a negative impact on its rivals’ ticket
prices. Next, we rely on more rigorous econometric methods to combine all markets and also
control for covariates.
We first control for mergers involving major airlines during our sample periods: Delta-
Northwest, Southwest-AirTran and United-Continental. Figure 1.2 provides the timeline
of these mergers. One concern is that our estimation may be biased by mergers.19 To
disentangle the impact of Spirit’s baggage fee policy from the potential merger effects, we
include a set of merger dummy variables for each of the 3 mergers.20 Using merger dummies
also introduces a complication. Because merging carriers make merger and pricing decisions
simultaneously, mergers must be endogenous to merging carriers’ ticket prices. To avoid this
endogeneity problem, we drop observations of merging carriers during the merger process
(i.e., merger has started but not finished). We believe, however, that mergers are exogenous
to non-merging carriers on a specific route. Merging decisions are made at the carrier level,
so they should not be affected by factors that determine prices at a specific route.
The diff-in-diff estimation results are presented in Table 1.5. We can see that after Spirit
19See Kim and Singal (1993) for more detailed discussions.
20More details about the merger dummies are provided in the Appendix.
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adopts carry-on baggage fee, its rivals reduce their prices by about 5.8% (at 5% significance
level). If we use average price rather than the log, then price goes down by $10.3 after
the policy change. Moving onto different parts of the price distribution, the results are
similar. Baggage fee policy has the largest impact on the 50-percentile – rivals’ median
prices go down by about 7.3%. The impact is slightly smaller and becomes marginally
significant (insignificant) for the 20-percentile (80-percentile) prices. We also include HHI
in regressions, and construct IVs to deal with the endogeneity of HHI.21 The estimates for
HHI are positive and significant, which is consistent with our expectation.22
1.4.3 Heterogeneous responses to policy by Spirit’s rivals
Previously we have shown that carriers adjust different points on their price distributions
somewhat differently. But do different carriers respond to Spirit’s baggage fee policy differ-
ently? In this section, we focus on whether the price response varies depending on carrier
types: (1) legacy carriers vs. LCCs; (2) whether the carrier subcontracts to regional car-
rier(s).
21Most of our IVs are similar to those used in the literature (e.g., Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)). These
IVs all pass under-identification test, weak identification test and over-identification test.
22However, some estimates in other regressions become insignificant and sometimes negative when the
sample observation becomes small. The culprit is likely insufficient variation in HHI in the sample we use.
For example, for the treated group, we restrict that Spirit and at least one other airline operates during
each sample period. This limits the HHI variation across time on any given Spirit market, which is what
matters since we control for route fixed effects. The matching process looks for comparable routes to form
the matched group. Together there is no enough variation across time in both treated and matched groups.
The standard deviation of HHI is about 0.165 in the whole sample (including routes not in the treated
and matched group), but goes down drastically to 0.108 and 0.127 in the treated group and matched group
respectively.
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Legacy carriers vs. LCCs: We start by comparing legacy carriers with LCCs. Table 1.6
reports summary stats for these two carrier types respectively. We can see that legacy carriers
are more likely to operate on routes with shorter distance, higher market concentration and
smaller passenger numbers. In addition, legacy carriers have fewer non-stop passengers, more
enplanement and higher ticket prices. Would this difference translate into different responses
by legacy carriers and LCCs to Spirit’s baggage fee policy? Our estimation results, presented
in Table 1.7, are mixed. Our focus is the triple interaction term. It is marginally significant
for the 20th- and 50-th percentile prices, but becomes insignificant for the 80th-percentile
and average prices.
Subcontracting status: Next, we examine the differential responses based upon carriers’
subcontracting status. Note that on routes where some major carriers subcontract to regional
carriers, there may be other major carriers on the same route which do not subcontract.
These non-subcontracting major carriers are indirectly affected by subcontracting status.
We remove non-subcontracting carriers on routes where some major carriers subcontract.
Therefore, observations for non-subcontracting major carriers all come from routes where
no major carrier subcontracts. Table 1.8 presents the summary stats for subcontracting and
non-subcontracting carriers respectively. On average, carriers are more likely to subcontract
on routes with shorter distance, fewer passengers, higher ticket prices and slightly higher
market concentration (HHI).23 The regression results are presented in Table 1.9. Again our
focus is on the triple interaction term.
23We also divide subcontracting and non-subcontracting markets further depending on whether Spirit
operates in that market. The comparisons between subcontracting and non-subcontracting carriers are
similar for Spirit markets, Non-Spirit markets and all markets.
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Relative to carriers on routes where no major carrier subcontracts, carriers which subcon-
tract reduce their average prices down by about 12.6%. This number goes up to 15.5% for
80th-percentile prices. The average fares for subcontracting and non-subcontracting carriers
are around $180 so a 12.6% reduction is about $22.7. To put this amount into perspective,
Spirit charges $20-$45 for carry-on baggage fees in 2010. This is also in line with the result in
model (5) which suggests that subcontracting status leads to a $25.6 reduction as response
to Spirit’s baggage fee policy. For non-subcontracting carriers, the price reduction (coming
from the interaction term SptMkt × Policy) is lower and becomes marginal significant or
insignificant.
1.4.4 Discussions
Previously we have shown that Spirit’s rivals reduce their prices after Spirit charges baggage
fee. Moreover, price reduction is larger for legacy carriers than LCCs and larger when the
major airline subcontracts its operations to regional carriers.
Let us first see why Spirit’s rivals reduce prices after the policy change. Spirit reduces its
basic ticket prices after charging carry-on baggage fee, because the cost of serving passengers
without carry-on bags is lower, and because lower basic fare attracts more passengers which
in turn generates more opportunities to profit from add-on prices. Price unbundling gives
consumers more flexibility when flying with Spirit since they can choose between lower basic
fare without carry-on baggage or higher inclusive fare with carry-on baggage. The lower
basic fare, together with the option of paying a fee for carry-on baggage, forces Spirit’s
rivals’ to lower their prices to stay competitive with Spirit.
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Our results on the comparison of LCCs vs. legacy carriers suggest that LCCs are becom-
ing more like legacy carriers, but some differences remain, especially at the low end of the
price distribution. Next, let us consider subcontracting status. If the major carrier operates
its own flights on a route, it pays all the cost and earns all the revenue. In contrast, if
it subcontracts operations to a regional carrier, say through a fixed payment contract, the
major carrier takes all ticket revenue (after paying the regional carrier a fixed amount), but
usually pays only part of the operation cost. When Spirit charges carry-on baggage fee,
basic fares go down but all-inclusive fares (including baggage fee) go up. Passengers with
carry-on baggage will now find major carriers more attractive (no carry-on baggage fee), yet
passengers without carry-on baggage will find Spirit more attractive (lower basic fares go).
The subsequent passenger reallocation thus raises major carriers’ cost. Major carriers take
higher cost into account and charge higher fares only when they do not subcontract. Thus,
the price reduction must be larger for subcontracting major carriers.
1.5 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several robustness checks.
We start with falsification tests to better illustrate that our econometric specification
properly controls for factors other than Spirit’s baggage fee policy. That is, we construct
settings where similar factors exist but there is no true policy change, and show that the
fake policy change has no significant impacts.
Fake treatment group
We first drop the observations of Spirit markets. Next, we randomly pick markets among
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Non-spirit markets and assign them to the treated group (and subject to Spirit’s baggage
fee policy). That is, we assign Fake SptMktj = 1 randomly to some non-Spirit markets.
Policyt is coded the same way as before. The results are presented in Table 1.10. The top
panel is for diff-in-diff, while the middle and bottom panels are for triple differences. From
the top panel, we can see that the interaction term is insignificant in all models, suggesting
that the fake treatment has no true impact. This is expected because no market in the group
actually receives the treatment of baggage fee policy. Similarly, the triple interaction terms
in the middle and bottom panels are all insignificant as well.
Fake treatment time
We assume that Spirit adopted its baggage fee policy at a different time period. To avoid
the impact of the actual policy, we only include data from pre-treatment periods, i.e., before
the actual policy was adopted. The pre-treatment data has 6 periods, and we select the
middle to be when the fake policy starts. That is, there are 3 periods each before and after
the fake policy. We define a new variable FakePolicyt which takes value 0 for the first 3
periods and 1 for the last 3 periods. We then run regressions with the same specification of
Table 1.5 except Policyt is replaced by FakePolicyt. The results are presented in Table 1.11.
The interaction term in the top panel and the triple interaction terms in the middle and
bottom panels are all insignificant, suggesting that the fake treatment has no real impacts.
Alternative comparison groups
Our diff-in-diff and triple difference regressions are run using the treated group and the
matched group. The matched group is constructed to best mimic the treated group using a
vector of route characteristics. One may be concerned that the specific choice of our matched
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group is the driving force behind our results. To alleviate such concerns, we use two different
comparison groups and show that the main results continue to hold.
First, we construct a different matched group. While it is unclear to us what criteria
Spirit relies on when deciding which market to enter, Spirit itself is endowed with such
information and is likely to use it to guide future entry decisions as well. Taking advantage
of this observation, we construct the first alternative comparison group as consisting of routes
which Spirit entered after our sample period ended in 2011. There is a little tweak though.
Entry into a new market takes time, and preparation may have started long before actual
entry. If so, incumbent carriers may respond to Spirit’s entry preparations. Taking this into
account, we drop year 2012-2013 and select the routes which Spirit entered in 2014-2015.
Using these routes as the comparison group, we then re-run the regressions. The results
are qualitatively the same (see Table 1.12), except that the magnitudes of the coefficients
vary slightly. These trends continue when we use the whole control group (consisting of all
non-Spirit routes), which is our second alternative comparison group (see Table 1.13 for the
corresponding estimation results).
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the impacts of Spirit’s carry-on baggage fee policy on its rivals’
prices. Our results suggest that Spirit’s rivals reduce their prices significantly in response
to its carry-on baggage fee. Taking into account carrier types, we find that legacy carriers
reduce their prices more significantly than LCCs do, but the difference occurs mainly at the
lower end of the price distribution. We also find that price reduction is significantly larger
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for Spirit’s rivals which subcontract their operations to regional airlines, relative to non-
subcontracting carriers. Due to the nature of the subcontracting contracts, regional carriers
endure significant risk when demand or supply shocks affects their operation costs, yet the
major carriers do not pay for the operation costs and thus do not necessarily take operation
costs into account when adjusting their prices in response to these shocks.
There are several extensions which we want to explore in future research. First, we would
like to run additional analysis that helps illustrate the mechanism and intuitions behind the
patterns of price responses observed in the data. Second, there are routes where some major
carriers subcontract but other major carriers do not. Our current treatment is to drop these
non-subcontracting major carriers on subcontracting routes. One may argue that a better
comparison is exactly such routes, by comparing subcontracting and non-subcontracting
carriers on the same routes. This would be an interesting direction.
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Chapter 2
Subcontracting Network Formation
among US Airline Carriers
2.1 Introduction
Network analysis is a highly popular approach in theoretical and empirical research across the
social sciences.1 In studying industry evolution, it offers an opportunity to treat corporate
agreements as links within a network of business relationships over time. This network of
relationships creates new opportunities to capture information flows and understand market
dynamics including pricing strategies.
1Network analysis has been used broadly in sociology (Currarini, Jackson and Pin, 2009; Offer and
Fischer, 2018; Isakov et al., 2019), in political science (Ward, Stovel and Sacks, 2011), in epidemiology
(Baraba´si, Gulbahce and Loscalzo, 2011), and in communications and psychology (Newman, 2001; Grunspan,
Wiggins and Goodreau, 2014) among other fields. Applications can be found in social media, partner choice,
trade relations, epidemics, scientific collaborations, board member relations, investor connections, R&D
collaborations, job market and natural disaster management. Jackson, Rogers and Zenou (2017) and Jackson
(2011) provide excellent reviews.
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We use network analysis to study the underpinnings of competition in the US airline
industry with a finer lens: one that provides a sharper image of the strength and persis-
tence of partnerships, and a way of understanding the interdependency among the airline
carriers’ decision making processes. The airline industry is dominated by a handful of strong
contenders, with small competing firms struggling to establish presence. Within this compet-
itive framework, the industry also engages in cooperative relationships, with subcontracting
of flight operation being the most popular form. In this paper, we tackle the airline industry
evolution from a whole new angle: we evaluate how network opportunities of airline com-
panies are formed through subcontracting engagement. The wealth of information that is
captured by the network’s links and the computational capacity it takes to chart the dy-
namics of interdependency offer a chance to zero in on the effects of market penetration and
expansion of firms in the industry.
A natural way of applying network analysis to the US airline industry is to investigate
factors that affect the evolution of network structure among carriers. While taking into
account non-subcontracting agreements, our focus is on networks formed through subcon-
tracting relationships. A network link is formed when a major carrier subcontracts a flight
service to a regional carrier. Within this framework, we make two distinct contributions.
First, we investigate factors that affect the formation of links among carriers on certain
routes. Second, we derive a causal effect of subcontracting on flight ticket prices.
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the interdependency among airline carriers,
we use newly developed approaches in Bayesian estimation methods discussed in Christakis
et al. (2010). We incorporate carriers’ subcontracting and non-subcontracting decisions into
a sequential game, and develop an empirical model of strategic network formation among US
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airline carriers. Our main findings are as follows. Subcontracting and non-subcontracting
decisions made by an airline company as well as its competitors play a crucial role in the
carrier’s subcontracting network formation and its evolution. Similarities in the routes two
carriers serve have a substantial impact on their subcontracting relationship and new link
formations. Their subcontracting decisions can also be explained by network characteristics
and previous connections. In turn, major carriers’ subcontracting behaviors have a significant
negative impact on flight ticket prices.
Our work extends existing research and creates a distinct focus: network analysis allows
us to incorporate the complexities introduced by contractual relationships formed across
different firms in a network, which traditional models are incapable of handling. In the paper,
we look at how subcontracting choices are evolving within its network and how competition
and expansion of firms are affected by network opportunities subcontracting creates. We
link network formation to questions of dynamic evolution of firms and provide opportunities
for direct policy evaluation of regulations regarding subcontracting.
We contribute to the literature in many ways. First, we further the study of network
formation by developing a framework for subcontracting choices. The paper most closely
related to ours methodologically in the literature is Christakis et al. (2010). They consider a
sample of 669 high school students and study how the formation of a social network affects
class performance. We extend the estimation approach used in their work by incorporating
dynamic interactions in multiple concurrent networks in the airline industry. Other related
studies focus on network formation in economics and finance, including networks among fine
art dealers and sellers (De Silva et al., 2017) and networks of interbank credit relationships
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(Lux, 2015).2 By applying recent methodological advances in network formation into the
study of the US airline industry, we are able to enhance our understanding of the inter-
dependency among airline carriers’ subcontracting relationships and how it shapes market
outcomes. Second, this paper contributes to the subcontracting/outsourcing literature in
the US airline industry.3 Many papers have studied why major carriers subcontract part
or all of their flight services to regional carriers on a route. The main reasons include cost
reduction (Fill and Visser, 2000; Rieple and Helm, 2008), risk consideration (Forbes and
Lederman, 2009), and market competition (Tan, 2018). All these studies focus on the major
carriers’ decisions. We close the gap by analyzing both types of carriers, major and regional,
and explore the impact of existing networks and the environment in decision making. Third,
we take this analysis a step further to study the impact of subcontracting on flight ticket
prices.4 In this field, Tan (2018) shows that major carriers’ ticket prices are lower on routes
where they subcontract more of their flight services. We advance the discussion by taking
into account the route level potential endogeneity issue of carriers’ subcontracting decisions
in their pricing strategies. Last, we add to the market entry literature in the airline industry.
2De Silva et al. (2017) investigate the drivers of strategic network formation between dealers and sellers
in a market for fine art as means of information acquisition and transmission impacting the dealers’ market
reach. Lux (2015) shows that a learning mechanism affects the link formation in the network of interbank
credit relationships.
3The exploration of subcontracting/outsourcing is motivated by a need to understand make-or-buy de-
cisions and has been the subject of study in various settings and industries besides the airline industry, such
as entertainment, health care and public service (De Silva et al., 2012; Marion, 2009).
4De Silva, Kosmopoulou and Lamarche (2012, 2017) study the effect of subcontracting on the survival and
business duration of firms in government procurement projects. De Silva, Kosmopoulou and Lamarche (2012)
shows that early involvement as a subcontractor increases the chance of survival. De Silva, Kosmopoulou
and Lamarche (2017) finds an apparent increase in the business life of firms who subcontract out part of
their projects.
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Previous research examines the determinants of carriers’ market/route entry decisions, in-
cluding airport presence (Berry, 1992), demand variation and airlines’ flexibility (Claussen,
Essling and Peukert, 2018), mergers (Benkard, Bodoh-Creed and Lazarev, 2019), airlines’ fi-
nancial conditions (Liu, 2009), and the size and utilization of airlines’ hub-and-spoke system
(Sinclair, 1995).5 In our paper, we study airlines’ market entry and subcontracting decisions
together shedding new light on the role of interdependency in market entry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides background informa-
tion about the relationships among US airline carriers. Section 2.3 presents our Bayesian
estimation method and the model. Section 2.4 describes how we construct the data and
variables. We present the estimation results in Section 2.5, while Section 2.6 studies the
effects of major carriers’ subcontracting behaviors on ticket prices. We conclude in Section
2.7.
2.2 Background of the US Airline Carriers’ Relation-
ships
In the US Airline industry, there are three commonly known types of carriers: major carriers,
low-cost carriers and regional carriers. Table 2.1 lists the names of the carriers in our sample
grouped by their types (consisting of 5 major, 9 low-cost and 22 regional carriers). Major
carriers, such as American, Delta and United Airlines, are carriers that sell tickets on routes
connecting the majority of airports in the US. Low-cost carriers, such as Southwest, AirTran
5Boguslaski, Ito and Lee (2004) study the entry patterns by a specific airline, Southwest.
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and Spirit Airlines serve similar routes at a lower cost without offering some or most of
the traditional services major carriers provide, such as seat assignments. Both major and
low-cost carriers are called network carriers since they both sell tickets in their networks of
routes.6 Regional carriers, like ExpressJet, SkyWest and Endeavor Airlines are less known to
passengers as they typically do not sell tickets themselves but operate regional aircrafts for
major carriers. Regional carriers have cost advantages in serving routes of short to medium
distances, due to the type of aircrafts being used and the lower wages being offered to their
staff.
Depending on the roles that airline carriers play in flight services, we distinguish between
ticketing and operating carriers. Ticketing carriers schedule flights, set ticket prices and
sell tickets to passengers. In most cases, ticketing carriers are network carriers. Operating
carriers provide flight services directly with their own aircrafts and staff. The same carrier
may or may not serve as both the ticketing and operating carrier. If the ticketing carrier and
the operating carrier are not the same for a flight service, they have reached a cooperative
agreement to serve the route, and we define the relationship they form at the route level.
This relationship varies depending on the ticketing carrier’s and the operating carrier’s types,
namely whether they are major, low-cost or regional carriers.
Table 2.2 summarizes the types of cooperative agreements among US airline carriers. If
the ticketing carrier and the operating carrier are the same for some flights across a route,
we call their service structure, self-service. If the ticketing carrier and the operating carrier
6A distinction is made here between a network carrier selling tickets in their network of routes and
a network created by a carrier which signifies the connections established across carriers via contractual
agreements to serve various routes.
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are different, four types of relationships can be identified: codesharing, subsidiary, subcon-
tracting, and “other-type”. These business relationships are formed by different agreements
and may have different underlying rationales. If ticketing carrier A is a network carrier and
operating carrier B is another network carrier, their relationship is characterized as “code-
sharing”. In this case, the flight is operated by network carrier B but the tickets are sold by
network carriers A and B together in each of their ticket selling systems. In other words, net-
work carrier A helps sell tickets for network carrier B. The other three types of relationships
are formed between major carriers and regional carriers.7 Specifically: 1) If the regional
operating carrier is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the major ticketing carrier or shares one
parent company with the major ticketing carrier, we label the relationship as subsidiary. 2)
If the major ticketing carrier has a long-term contract with the regional operating carrier,
we call their contractual relationship subcontracting. In this case, the major carrier sub-
contracts part or all of its flight services on some routes to the regional carrier. It should
be noted that, wholly-owned subsidiaries never form subcontracting relationships with any
major carrier and thus the regional carrier being subcontracted to can only be an inde-
pendent regional carrier. 3) When the firms are not forming a subcontracting relationship
and the regional carrier is not a subsidiary, we categorize the relationship as “other-type”.
This category includes three types of uncommon interactions: a) the major ticketing carrier
may subcontract indirectly to the regional operating carrier, and in other words, the major
ticketing carrier codeshares with another major carrier, which owns or subcontracts to the
7Even though we may observe a relationship formed between a low-cost ticketing carrier and a regional
operating carrier, this is rare.
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regional operating carrier;8 b) the major ticketing carrier may codeshare with the regional
operating carrier and help sell the regional carrier’s flight tickets under the major carrier’s
system; and c) gate switching occurs between carriers.9 We group these three cases together
as “other-type” for simplicity. This allows us to simplify the framework and focus on carriers’
subcontracting relationships and the networks created through this activity. In summary,
we have in total five types of relationships among airline carriers including self-service.
Since non-subcontracting relationships may have an impact on carriers’ subcontracting
decisions, we consider and control for the possible non-subcontracting relationships a major
carrier or an independent regional carrier may have on a route. For major carriers, the five
types of relationships are not mutually exclusive. In other words, a major ticketing carrier
on a route may have up to four types of non-subcontracting relationships with other carriers
while still be involved in subcontracting. Likewise, an independent regional operating carrier
may have up to two types of non-subcontracting relationships on a route while engaging in
subcontracting. These non-subcontracting relationships further complicate our task of ex-
plaining carriers’ subcontracting relationships and networks because of the interdependency
of carriers’ decisions on their subcontracting and non-subcontracting relationships. In the
next section, we discuss the model and estimation method which enables us to accomplish
this task.
8Unfortunately, we are not able to identify the intermediary major carrier between the major ticketing
carrier and the regional operating carrier since there may be more than one potential intermediary major
carrier.
9In certain situations, the major ticketing carrier actually operates the flight itself but has to use a
regional carrier’s gate at the airport. If this happens, the regional carrier which has contracted the use of
the gate will be reported as the operating carrier. Gate switching will thus lead to a situation where a major
carrier is serving as the ticketing carrier and a regional becomes the operating carrier.
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2.3 The Model and Estimation Method
We analyze carriers’ subcontracting networks at route level. The airline route is defined as a
non-directional route between two airports in the US. For example, the route from Chicago
O’Hare International Airport to New York John F. Kennedy International Airport and that
from New York John F. Kennedy International Airport to Chicago O’Hare International
Airport are considered the same.10 Assume there are I major carriers and J independent
regional carriers operating on M routes for T time periods11. Since subcontracting is a
directional relationship (a major carrier subcontracts to a regional carrier and not vice versa),
the subcontracting networks between major and regional carriers are directional as well. We
say that a link, Linksijmt = 1 (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J},m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}, t ∈
{1, 2, ..., T}), forms if the major carrier i subcontracts to the regional carrier j on route
m in period t, and otherwise Linksijmt = 0. The superscript s indicates that the link is
established through subcontracting. Carriers’ non-subcontracting relationships may also
impact their subcontracting network formation. As such, we aggregate major carriers’ non-
subcontracting relationships by category and incorporate them into the network. We define
Linknsilmt = 1, where l ∈ {Self-Service, Subsidiary, Code-Sharing, Other-Type}, if the major
carrier i has the relationship of l with relevant carriers on route m in period t, and otherwise
Linknsilmt = 0. The superscript ns indicates that the link is related to non-subcontracting
10Airlines seldom subcontract at only one direction on a route. This is a common definition following the
literature in the US airline industry, for example, Borenstein (1989).
11Since we are focusing on the subcontracting networks between major carriers and independent regional
carriers, we mainly consider their behaviors and do not directly model the behaviors of other types of carriers,
including low-cost carriers and wholly-owned subsidiaries. For other types of carriers, only their presence on
routes is incorporated in the model.
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activities. Likewise, we define independent regional carriers’ non-subcontracting networks in
the same way. Linknsjemt = 1, where e ∈ {Self-Service, Other-Type}, if the regional carrier
j has the relationship of e with relevant carriers on route m in period t, and otherwise
Linknsjemt = 0.
The link matrix Linkmt is combining an I × J subcontracting adjacency link matrix,
an I × 4 aggregated non-subcontracting link matrix of major carriers and a J × 2 aggre-
gated non-subcontracting link matrix of independent regional carriers to present the entire
landscape of relationships within m and t. The distinct pairs of i and j elements of the
subcontracting adjacency link matrix Linksijmt (i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}) repre-
sent the potential subcontracting relationships on route m in period t. Likewise, the dis-
tinct pairs of i and l elements of major carriers’ non-subcontracting link matrix Linknsilmt
(i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, l ∈ {Self-Service, Subsidiary,Code-Sharing,Other-Type}) represent all
of the potential aggregated non-subcontracting relationships of major carriers. The dis-
tinct pairs of j and e elements of regional carriers’ non-subcontracting link matrix Linknsjemt
(j ∈ {1, 2, ..., J}, e ∈ {Self-Service,Other-Type}) represent all of the potential aggregated
non-subcontracting relationships of independent regional carriers.
Table 2.3 presents a subcontracting adjacency link matrix, a non-subcontracting link ma-
trix of major carriers and a non-subcontracting link matrix of independent regional carriers
that could synthesize a potential link matrix linkmt in the case of 3 major carriers and 3
regional carriers on route m in period t. The 3 × 3 matrix in the first panel has entries
indicating whether a major carrier subcontracts to a regional carrier forming a link in the
subcontracting network. For example, the entry in the second row and second column indi-
cates that Major carrier 2 forms a link with and subcontracts to Regional carrier 2. However,
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Major carrier 2 does not form a link with Regional carrier 1 indicated by the 0 entry in the
second row and first column. The 3× 2 matrix in the second panel shows whether indepen-
dent regional carriers form non-subcontracting relationships. The 3× 4 matrix in the third
panel indicates whether major carriers have non-subcontracting relationships.12 13
In our paper, we extend the Bayesian estimation method developed in Christakis et al.
(2010) in a dynamic framework of multiple concurrent networks. During each period t,
carriers may decide to engage in contractual or non-contractual relationships with other
carriers or may self-serve their demand according to some event order (EOt). The event order
is not fixed arbitrarily but determined endogenously within the framework of our Bayesian
estimation as described in the Appendix. Those events include what we will call “meetings”
between major and regional carriers, where they determine on which routes to establish or
maintain a subcontracting relationship (by forming or maintaining a link). We model each
period’s interaction between a major and a regional carrier as a single meeting occurrence
leading to a possible subcontracting decision. As a result, if all I major carriers and all J
regional carriers are active in period t, EOt will contain in total I × J potential meetings
between major and regional carriers. Besides those meetings, EOt also includes events when
major carriers or regional carriers can decide whether or not to establish or maintain other
non-subcontracting relationships with relevant carriers in each route. In addition, there is
12It should be noted that, in this example, Major carrier 3 subcontracts to Regional carrier 1 and 2
and has all four types of non-subcontracting relationships at the same time. This is possible since these
relationships are not mutually exclusive for major carriers. In addition, all elements for Major carrier 1 are
0, indicating that Major carrier 1 does not operate on route m in period t.
13For later reference, we also define Linkt as the aggregation of Linkmt across all routes and Link as the
aggregation of Linkt across all time periods. Correspondingly, Linkt represents all relationships in period t.
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an event in EOt for low-cost carriers to decide which routes to enter.
14 The outcomes of
each event in period t are observable to all carriers immediately after the event so carriers
make their decisions based upon what already happened in the same period. We define EO
as the aggregation of EOt across time and EventOrder as the set which contains all possible
event orders (EO).
After having defined the way in which we record the network and the order in which
carriers make decisions, we now describe how the network evolves within period t. We
define TempLinkOtmt as the transition link matrix through which the network on route m
evolves from Linkm,t−1, the network observed in the last period, to Linkmt, the network
observed in the current period, with Ot = {0, 1, ..., rt} signifying the number of events taking
place within t. We set TempLink0mt = Linkm,t−1 at the beginning of each period t, and
through the event order TempLinkOtmt is transformed taking into account the decisions that
are made sequentially within t. In more details, before any event, if any major carrier i or
regional carrier j either exits all routes, goes bankrupt or merges with another carrier in
the current period t, we set TempLink0imt = 0 or TempLink
0
jmt = 0 respectively following
the assumption that if any carrier stops operating in period t it is known to all carriers at
the beginning of the period. Subsequently, active major carriers and regional carriers make
decisions sequentially according to an event order EOt that will be estimated endogenously.
After each event, TempLinkOtmt is updated according to the outcome of the event. In the next
event in order, carriers make their decisions conditional on the updated TempLinkOtmt. After
all the events take place within t, TempLinkOtmt evolves to Linkmt, describing the network
14Please see the Appendix for an example of a potential event order.
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that has formed in the current period.15 During this process, the event order EOt determines
the way in which Linkm,t−1 evolves to Linkmt. For later reference, we define TempLinkOtt
as the aggregation of TempLinkOtmt across all routes.
Next, we specify the utility of each subcontracting link formation for major carriers and
regional carriers. Let k be an indicator of the type of a carrier, major (k = 1) or regional
(k = 2), that could potentially be serving a route. Let U1 (U2) represents the functional
form identifying the utility of a major (regional) carrier. Major carrier i is willing to form a
link with regional carrier j on route m in time t if utility U1ijmt is greater than or equal to
zero. Likewise, regional carrier j will form a link with major carrier i on route m in time t
if U2ijmt ≥ 0.
In general terms, we denote the utility function as Ukijmt for k = {1, 2} and let
Ukijmt = α
k
t + λ
k
1i + λ
k
2j + f
k(Linkt−1) + gk(TempLinkOtt |EOt) + hk(X) + kijmt, (2.1)
where αkt indicates time fixed effects, λ
k
1i major carrier fixed effects and λ
k
2j regional carrier
fixed effects. Ukijmt is a function of Linkt−1 the network in the last period, and also a function
of the transition network TempLinkOtt of the current period conditional on the event order.
It should be noted that the event order is exogenous in the reduced form of the utility
function, although it will be estimated endogenously within the larger Bayesian estimation
framework. We denote by X other covariates which may affect the utility gains from link
formation. We also assume the error term kijmt follows a type I extreme value distribution.
15As mentioned earlier, this event order is ultimately determined not randomly but within the framework
of the estimation as will be described in the Appendix.
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Thus, after we take the integral of kijmt, the probability that the carrier gains a non-negative
utility and is willing to form the link will be given by the following equation for k ∈ {1, 2}
ln(
Pr(Ukijmt ≥ 0)
1− Pr(Ukijmt ≥ 0)
) = αkt +λ
k
1i+λ
k
2j+f
k(Linkt−1)+gk(TempLinkOtt |EOt)+hk(X). (2.2)
A link forms when both carriers’ utilities are non-negative, leading to the following prob-
ability of link formation
Pijmt = Pr(Link
s
ijmt = 1) = Pr(U
1
ijmt ≥ 0)Pr(U2ijmt ≥ 0). (2.3)
Define β the parameter vector for functions fk, gk, and hk as well as fixed effect controls αkt ,
λk1i, and λ
k
2j characterizing utilities represented by Equation (2.1). Given an event order, the
joint likelihood function of a given network is
L(β|EO,Link) =
∏
t∈{2,...,T}
∏
(i,j)∈(It,Jt)|EOt
∏
m∈{1,...,M}
(Pijmt)
Linksijmt(1− Pijmt)1−Linksijmt . (2.4)
It and Jt are the sets of major carriers and independent regional carriers that are active
in period t. The likelihood function is the product of the probabilities of link formation
outcomes across routes, major carriers, regional carriers and time given a network Link and
an event order EO. It describes the overall probability that a given network forms. We allow
major carriers’ and regional carriers’ decisions to be determined endogenously and focus on
modeling which factors determine their subcontracting relationships. However, we do not
model the factors affecting carriers’ decisions of non-subcontracting relationships in the joint
likelihood function, which is outside the scope of the paper.
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Before we explain how we estimate β, the parameter vector characterizing the utility
functions, it is worth discussing its interpretation. The dependent variables are the proba-
bility/utility gains of major carriers and regional carriers forming a link, and thus βn (the
nth element in β) measures the marginal effect of the independent variable on the probability
of link formation. Link formation means the establishment of a subcontracting relationship
between a major carrier and a regional carrier on a route. Although this description is en-
compassing for regional carriers, it is incomplete for major carriers that may or may not
currently be serving the route. In that regard, we are comparing the behaviors of major
carriers serving the route via subcontracting with that of carriers already operating on the
route, offering different services, and those who after exploring all options decide not to
enter. For simplicity, we say that a major carrier’s link formation decision is its decision of
entry in subcontracting services within a route.16 17 We call the current model as the model
of all major carriers.
Although it is important to consider the decision to offer subcontracting services among
all potential entrants and existing carriers on a route, it is also important to study the
choice to form subcontracting relationships conditional on entry decisions. Our next model
is emphasizing the make-or-buy trade-offs in the decision making process. While in the first
16It should be noted that route entry in subcontracting services and route entry in other services are
different decisions and made in separate events. We incorporate major carriers’ route entry decisions in all
forms in the model, but only focus on explaining major carriers’ route entry in subcontracting services.
17Through a program called Essential Air Service (EAS), the United States Department of Transportation
subsidizes some carriers to provide flight service to eligible small airports/communities otherwise no flight
service will be provided. This program may bias our estimation of major carriers’ route entry behavior.
However, only 6 routes out of almost 4000 are subsidized through major carriers so we do not think this will
be a significant concern.
43
model, we considered every major carrier on the route including potential entrants, in the
second, we look at the choices of service existing major carriers on a route make conditional
on route entry. Therefore, we assume major carriers’ entry or exit decisions precede service
choice decisions in each period.
This assumption changes two components of the model. First, it affects how the network
evolves at the beginning of each period t, namely, it impacts the form of TempLink0mt.
18
Second, it changes the joint likelihood function,
L(β|EO,Link) =
∏
t∈{2,...,T}
∏
(i,j)∈(It,Jt)|EOt
∏
m∈Mit
(Pijmt)
Linksijmt(1− Pijmt)1−Linksijmt , (2.5)
where Mit is the set of routes on which major carrier i operates in period t. The likelihood
function in this case is the product of the probabilities of link formation outcomes across
only the routes where each major carrier operates rather than all routes. Thus we call this
model, the model of route-serving major carriers. As a result, for major carriers, each β now
helps capture and isolate the marginal effect only on their subcontracting decisions which
are conditional on route presence.
We use a Bayesian estimation method (Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo) to estimate β and
update event order.19 After a large number of iterations, the distribution of the parameters
as well as the event order will converge to a posterior distribution. Obtaining the estimates
18In the model of all major carriers, after we set TempLink0mt = Linkm,t−1 at the beginning of each
period t, we set TempLink0imt = 0 if major carrier i exits all routes, goes bankrupt or merges with another
carrier. In this model, the condition for setting TempLink0imt = 0 refers to exit decision on the single route
m.
19Details are relegated to the Appendix.
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of the parameters from the last 500 iterations, which constitute the posterior distribution,
we calculate the estimated means of the parameters and check from the distribution whether
they are significantly different than zero.20
2.4 Data and Variables
The main data we use is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data, which is
a 10% quarterly sample of airline tickets sold. DB1B Coupon Data records flight segment
level21 data, and provides the variables including year, quarter, origin airport, destination
airport, route distance, ticketing carrier, operating carrier, and passenger number. We also
use the Regional Airline Association (RAA) annual reports to identify subcontracting part-
nerships between major carriers and regional carriers. Our data sample covers the periods
from the 3rd quarter of 2013 to the 3rd quarter of 2017. We aggregate DB1B Coupon data to
route-quarter-ticketing carrier-operating carrier level and obtain a sample of 5 major carriers,
17 independent regional carriers, 3889 routes and 17 quarters.22
20Our identification strategy can be explained as follows. Although we have some exogenous variables,
such as population, employment and income around end-point airports, and although we also include time
fixed effect, capturing technology growth which makes subcontracting increasingly popular, we are not
focusing on studying how these external forces change the networks from one equilibrium to another over
time. Instead, we are focusing on how firms interact with each other. By incorporating the latent event
order into the model, firms’ decisions in previous events become exogenous to firms’ decision makings in the
current event. As a result, the identification of the estimates capturing firms’ interdependency relies on the
variations in firms’ decisions in previous events.
21Flight segment means the flight is from airport A to airport B. For some passengers A and B can be
their origin and destination. For others the flight is a segment of their connecting flights, and A and B are
not their origin and/or destination.
22The Appendix describes our data filter and variable construction in detail.
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Table 2.4 lists the subcontracting partnerships between major carriers and regional car-
riers at the carrier level in quarter 3 of 2014 from the RAA annual reports. The regional
carriers in bold are the wholly-owned subsidiaries of the corresponding major carriers. For
each major carrier, there is at least one independent regional carrier being subcontracted to.
In addition, more than one major carrier may subcontract to the same regional carrier. For
example, all five major carriers subcontract to SkyWest. Thus, between major and regional
carriers, an interdependent network forms by their subcontracting relationships.
Figure 2.1 aggregates carriers’ subcontracting networks across routes and over time. The
nodes marked in green represent major carriers and those in red represent independent
regional carriers. The gray arrows, pointing from major carriers to regional carriers, indicate
subcontracting relationships, which are also directional links in the networks. The thickness
of the arrows measures the number of routes on which two carriers established subcontracting
relationships during the period. Panel (a) illustrates the subcontracting network in the third
quarter of 2013, from which we can see that some carriers had many links, such as United
and SkyWest, while others only had one link, such as Alaska and Compass. Some carriers
did not engage in any subcontracting relationship at all. Besides the variation in the number
of distinct links within a period, the network evolved over time as can be seen in the series of
panels presented in Figure 2.1. Through market consolidation, US Airways and Chautauqua
with their network structure were absorbed by other carriers, and thus disappeared from the
network. American and Compass increased their numbers of network connections. Our goal
is to measure changes in the network structure over time and understand the consequences
of those changes on airline expansion and pricing policy.
Figure 2.2 plots the average numbers of major carriers, regional carriers, and link numbers
46
across routes over time. In general, the average number of major carriers on each route is
less than 1, because some routes are only served by low-cost carriers and some routes are
not served by any carrier during certain periods. The drop in the number of major carriers
and the number of links around the third quarter of 2015 is caused by the merger between
American and US Airways. In addition to the merger, the fluctuation in the average numbers
of major carriers is caused by major carriers’ route entry and exit decisions. The fluctuation
in the numbers of regional carriers, however, is mainly caused by subcontracting, since non-
subcontracting relationships only count for a tiny fraction of regional carriers’ business. We
observe that after the 3rd quarter of 2016, although the average number of major carriers
on each route is nearly constant, the average numbers of regional carriers and links on each
route decrease.
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 present, in more detail, the major carriers’ and regional carriers’
subcontracting behaviors respectively. Figure 2.3 plots major carriers’ subcontracting route
numbers over time. In general, major carriers which subcontract on more routes, such as
United and Delta airlines, decrease their subcontracting route numbers over time, while car-
riers such as American and Alaska have an increasing trend in their subcontracting route
numbers. Figure 2.4 provides similar data on regional carriers. Since we have too many re-
gional carriers, we only select to graph those whose changes in subcontracting route numbers
are the greatest over time. The figure shows that SkyWest, Republic, GoJet and Trans States
expand their business through subcontracting while the number of routes ExpressJet served
decreases. Figure 2.5 illustrates the networks of two regional carriers’ routes on which they
are subcontracted to over time. The panels to the left show the route networks of Express-
Jet, which shrink gradually over time. The panels to the right display Skywest’s expanding
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subcontracting business engagement over time. These figures display a large amount of vari-
ations in carriers’ subcontracting relationships, which further provides us with the incentive
to study the causes of carriers’ subcontracting.
Based on the modeling framework described in Equation (2.1) in Section 2.3 and the
variables we have constructed from the data, listed in Table A2.2, we use the following linear
specification for carriers’ utilities and estimate the effect of these factors on the formation of
the network
Ukijmt =α
k
t + λ
k
1i + λ
k
2j + δ
kTempLinkV art + φ
kLinkV art−1
+ βkHomophily + θkCarrierChar + γkRouteChar + kijmt, k = 1, 2. (2.6)
TempLinkV art are variables generated from TempLink
Ot
t , the transition network, condi-
tional on which the major carrier and the regional carrier make their subcontracting deci-
sions. One advantage of our estimation method is that it allows us to derive the causal effect
of TempLinkV art on carriers’ subcontracting decisions, which cannot be identified by tradi-
tional estimation methods because of the simultaneity issue. We also generate LinkV art−1
from Linkt−1, the variables characterizing the features of the network in the last period.
We expect that the network formed up until the last period has an impact on the network
formation in the current period. Homophily represents measures that capture the similarity
between the major and the regional carriers in terms of the routes they serve. We expect
that the more similar the carriers are, the more likely they will form and maintain a subcon-
tracting relationship on a route. We also control for some carrier and route characteristics
(CarrierChar and RouteChar). Our focus is on variables TempLinkV art, LinkV art−1
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and Homophily. Table A2.2 provides detailed description of all the variables used in our
estimation.23.
Table 2.5 presents summary statistics of our sample and the variables used in Equa-
tion 2.6. Considering the time route level summary, we can see that on average there are
0.632 major carriers, 0.556 regional carriers and 0.598 links on a route. The maximum link
number on a route which is observed in our sample is 13. Among non-subcontracting rela-
tionships, self-service and subsidiary are more common than code-sharing and “other-type”
of relationships for major carriers. As we stated earlier, regional carriers’ non-subcontracting
relationships only count for a tiny fraction of their business. A large amount of variation
in subcontracting activity is captured in our data and these variables are allowing a more
precise estimation of effects. The table also presents the summary statistics of our covari-
ates, including route characteristics, such as route distance, airport precipitation, snow fall,
population, income and employment, and carrier characteristics, such as passenger numbers,
route numbers and market shares. These variables also indicate substantial variation.
2.5 Estimation Results
In Section 2.3, we developed two models of carrier decision making. In the first, we model
concurrently their route entry and subcontracting choices. As such, we take into account all
major carriers’ behaviors including those operating on each route and potential entrants.24
23One concern we may have is that carriers’ participation in international flight service may affect their
subcontracting behaviors in the domestic market. However, since we are already controlling for carriers’ past
passenger numbers at route level, international passengers connecting to a domestic flight are also controlled.
24One should note that here the route entry by a major carrier refers to whether the major carrier sells
flight tickets on the route and the subcontracting decision refers to whether the major carrier provides flight
49
In the second model of route-serving major carriers, we focus on the decisions of those major
carriers that operate on each route ex-post.
In this section, we estimate the two models. For each model, we run the estimation
with 1000 iterations to update parameters and the event order. Then, we use the last 500
estimates as the posterior distributions of the parameters following Christakis et al. (2010).
In each model, we control for carrier fixed effect, time fixed effect, carrier characteristics and
route characteristics in both major carrier’s and regional carrier’s utility functions.25 Table
2.6 presents results consisting of the estimated means of the coefficients from the posterior
distribution and in parentheses the probabilities that the parameters have the opposite sign
of their reported means.26 The first two columns report the estimation results from the model
of all major carriers and the last two columns those from the model of route-serving major
carriers. The coefficients in the first column capture a major carrier’s utility gains trans-
lated into the probabilities for the major carrier to enter a route in subcontracting services
with a regional carrier, while those in the second column capture a regional carrier’s utility
gains/probabilities of helping a major carrier enter a route in a subcontracting relationship.27
The third and fourth columns provide coefficients on the probabilities respectively that a
major carrier and a regional carrier will form a subcontracting relationship conditional on
the major carrier’s route presence. Figures A2.1-A2.4 in the Appendix provide plots of the
service to the route through subcontracting.
25Carrier characteristics and route characteristics are listed and explained as in Table A2.2. Estimates of
these covariates are available upon request.
26The smaller the probability is, the more likely that the coefficient is significantly different from 0.
27Note that the estimated coefficients provide the directions and statistical significance of the effects from
the variables, but they are not marginal effects themselves.
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kernel densities of the posterior distributions of the parameters specified in each of the four
columns of Table 2.6 separately.
We first consider the impact of the first set of variables, TempLinkV art, on link formation
of carriers’ subcontracting networks. Our interest in this set of variables stems from the fact
that they help explain the interdependency among airline carriers in decision making. The
estimated coefficient of RivalLinkimt in the first column, for example, indicates that a major
carrier is more likely to enter a route in subcontracting services if its rivals have already
formed a link. The corresponding coefficient in the third column indicates that an existing
major carrier on a route is also more likely to subcontract to a regional carrier if its rivals
are already doing so. The intuition is straightforward. Subcontracting allows major carriers
to create a cost advantage, so if one major carrier subcontracts, it will be easier for other
major carriers to compete on the route if they subcontract as well. The regional carrier,
on the other hand, is less likely to establish a subcontracting relationship if its rivals (other
regional carriers) have already established persistent subcontracting relationships, indicated
by the negative coefficient of RivalLinkjmt in the second and fourth columns. It implies
that if a regional carrier already established its active presence on a route, other regional
carriers will prefer to avoid direct competition. Why do major carriers prefer competing
while regional carriers do not? One explanation could be that the passenger market is
more competitive than the subcontracting market. It is well known that airline carriers
could enter the passenger market freely after the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. Unlike
the passenger market which has many buyers, the subcontracting market only involves few
buyers (major carriers), so market incumbency, reputation and installed capacity may play
a more important role for regional carriers in attracting business from major carriers, which
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could lead to a higher barrier to entry in the subcontracting market. In addition, regional
carriers may already face great pressure from bargaining with major carriers so they tend to
avoid competition among themselves in order to survive.
The variables identifying the impact of a major carrier’s remaining types of business con-
tact on network formation reveal the interdependency among a major carrier’s own decisions.
The first column shows the estimation results of the effects on the major carriers’ route entry
in subcontracting services. The estimation results show that if a major carrier is already
serving the route via either subcontracting (OtherLinkiijmt), self-service (SelfServiceimt),
the use of subsidiaries (Subsidiaryimt), codesharing (CodeSharingimt) or “other-type” of
contractual agreements (OtherTypeimt), it is more likely to enter the route in subcontract-
ing services with another regional carrier. Intuitively we are comparing a major carrier’s
subcontracting decision when it already serves a route with its decision when it has not yet
entered a route, with the major carrier’s route presence leading to an increase in the prob-
ability to subcontract to a regional carrier. The same variables in the third column explain
the interdependency among a major carrier’s own decisions from another perspective, offer-
ing the tradeoffs in engaging in one versus another form of contractual relationship. The
estimation results show that if an existing major carrier on a route already subcontracts
to a regional carrier, codeshares with a major carrier or has an “other-type” relationship,
it is less likely to subcontract to another regional carrier. On the other hand, if a major
carrier already serves the route by itself or uses a wholly-owned subsidiary, it is more likely
to subcontract out part of its service. In other words, for existing major carriers on a route,
self-service and use of subsidiaries are complementary to their subcontracting behaviors,
while subcontracting itself, code-sharing and “other-type” relationships are substitutes to
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other subcontracting activity. Those findings suggest that a major airline’s subcontracting
choices across regional carriers within a market are substitute services since the regionals
practically sell the same services with quality variations. At the same time, accommodat-
ing frequent flight changes within a route may necessitate a major carrier’s subcontracting
behaviors to complement the use of its own flights or wholly-owned subsidiary companies.
When major carriers’ flight needs cannot be satisfied by their own or subsidiaries’ services,
they will seek outside options. Subcontracting, code-sharing and “other-type” are all major
carriers’ outside options, and thus are substitutes to each other.
The variables OtherLinkjijmt, SelfServicejmt, and OtherTypejmt reveal the interdepen-
dency among a regional carrier’s own decisions. The positive coefficients on these variables
in the second and fourth columns imply that if the regional carrier is already serving the
route via subcontracting, self-service or “other-type” relationships, it is more likely to help
a major carrier enter the route in subcontracting services or establish a subcontracting re-
lationship with an existing major carrier on the route. In other words, a regional carrier’s
route presence increases its probability of forming a link on the route.
The next category of variables in the table uses the carriers’ route structures to measure
their similarities represented in Homophily measures. One of the two variables constructed,
measures the number of common routes for two carriers in the last period. The other is the
metric distance (difference) between two carriers’ passenger distributions across all routes.
It is expected that, the more similar the major carrier and the regional carrier are, the
more likely they will be to form a link. Our estimation results confirm this expectation.
We find that the more common routes the major carrier and regional carrier served in
the last period, the more likely they are to form a link on a route in the current period
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(CommonRtNmbrij,t−1). In the same spirit, the larger the MetricDistanceij,t−1 is, the less
likely they will be to form a link in the current period.
The variables grouped as TempLinkV art explore choices and tradeoffs and the evolution
of the subcontracting network within a period. The set of variables LinkV art−1, which
are generated from the network of the last period, helps us understand the impact of the
networks in the last period on the network formations in the current period and the dynamics
of network formations. The most informative constructs revealing the structure and strength
of the subcontracting network are in the carriers’ centrality measures. They capture the
role of a carrier in establishing, maintaining and expanding a network of subcontracting
activities both at the carrier level and the route-carrier level. In our estimation, we include
two main centrality measures, namely, hub centrality and authority centrality. Hub and
authority centralities, normalized to [0, 1], measure a carrier’s subcontracting links, and
assign different weights to those links according to their importance (measured by the number
of subcontracting connections) of the carriers it’s been linked to. A high hub node points to
many significant subcontracting partners with critical value to the subcontracting network. A
high authority node signifies that a regional airline is subcontracted to by many major airlines
with a large number of established links. Due to the directional nature of subcontracting
agreements, hub centrality is only meaningful for major airlines and authority centrality
for regional airlines. In our particular case, a carrier’s centrality essentially measures the
position of a carrier in the subcontracting network through its links to other well-connected
carriers. As a result, it captures how much market power a carrier has in the imperfectly
competitive subcontracting market.
Centralities at carrier subcontracting network level in general, display negative coeffi-
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cients. The table shows that if a carrier was relatively more important in the carrier level
networks in the last period, it is less likely to form a link and other carriers are also less
likely to form a link with this carrier in the current period (indicated by the coefficients
of HubCentralityi,t−1 and AuthCentralityj,t−1). In other words, a carrier’s overall subcon-
tracting market power in the last period decreases both its own and its counterpart’s chances
for link formation.
One should note that a carrier’s centrality at carrier network level mentioned above
measures the carrier’s overall subcontracting market power while the centrality at route-
carrier network level captures the carrier’s subcontracting market power on a particular
route. A carrier may have significant subcontracting market power overall but little power
on a particular route, and vice versa. The estimation results of HubCentralityim,t−1 and
AuthCentralityjm,t−1 in the first column show that both centralities of major carrier and
regional carrier have negative impacts on a major carrier’s route presence in subcontracting
services, while those in the third column indicate that both centralities increase the prob-
ability of a route-serving major carriers’ link formation. For a regional carrier, it is more
likely to form a link if the regional carrier has a smaller centrality or the major carrier has
a larger centrality as reported by the estimation results of those variables in the second and
fourth columns.
In the set of LinkV art−1, we also include two variables to describe the connections
between a major carrier and regional carrier in the subcontracting network of the last period.
The positive significant coefficients of SameLinkNmbrij,t−1 and Linkijm,t−1 in all columns
indicate that the stronger the established connections of two carriers are, the more likely it
is for them to maintain their connections and form new links.
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2.6 Effects on Ticket Prices
In this section, we investigate another important question: the effects of major carriers’
subcontracting behaviors on their ticket prices. Theoretically the answer to the questions is
unclear. On the one hand, the lower operating cost from regional carriers should decrease
ticket prices. On the other hand, limiting direct market competition in these markets may
lead to higher prices and profits. Tan (2018) shows that major carriers’ ticket prices are lower
on routes where they subcontract more of their flight services. In our paper, we further take
into account the interactions among major carriers within a route, which leads to the issue of
endogenous subcontracting decisions in a linear regression, that has not been studied before.
A major carrier’s subcontracting decisions are endogenous in a linear regression not only
because the major carrier makes subcontracting and pricing decisions simultaneously but
also because the major carrier’s rivals’ behaviors affect its subcontracting decisions, which
in turn affect the rivals’ pricing strategy.
In order to address the endogeneity issue, we use an instrumental variable, the major
carriers’ probabilities of subcontracting. This IV is constructed based on the estimation
in the last section. Given the estimated means of the parameters and the last used event
order in the model of all major carriers, we calculate predicted probabilities that each major
carrier subcontracts to each regional carrier on route m in period t, ˆPijmt. The constructed
IV, IVmt, is the predicted probability that there is any subcontracting behavior on route m
in period t
IVmt = 1−
∏
i∈It,j∈Jt
(1− ˆPijmt). (2.7)
This instrument satisfies the following three conditions. First, it is exogenous to airline ticket
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prices since in our structural model, airline carriers make subcontracting decisions before
they make their pricing decisions. As a result, the predicted probabilities of subcontracting
are generated before airlines set their ticket prices. Second, the predicted probability of
subcontracting is highly correlated with carriers’ actual subcontracting decisions, with a
correlation coefficient of 0.8942. Finally, the probability of subcontracting should affect
ticket prices only through carriers’ actual subcontracting and should not be used to explain
ticket prices directly.
Ticket price information is obtained from DB1B Market Data. We filter the dataset in
the following way. We only keep non-stop ticket prices. Following the literature, we drop
the ticket prices smaller than $10 and the highest 2% ticket prices for each route-quarter-
ticketing carrier-operating carrier, and aggregate the data into route-quarter-ticketing carrier
level. Table 2.7 presents summary statistics of the ticket price data being used. We focus
our interest on Subcontractingmt, a dummy variable indicating whether there is any sub-
contracting behavior by major carriers on route m in period t. Based on this table, 47.4%
of the observations are on a route where major carriers subcontract to regional carriers and
63.7% of the observations are on a route where low-cost carriers operate. The predicted
probability IVmt is the instrumental variable for Subcontractingmt. We capture the market
concentration level by HHImt, which is calculated based upon passenger numbers of non-stop
flights. The average ticket price of ticketing carrier i on route m in period t is represented by
Fareimt.
28 The mean of ticket prices is $196 for a non-stop one way trip with the standard
deviation of $74.5. The smallest and largest fares are $10 and $932 respectively.
28The ticketing carrier includes all types of carriers, not only major carrier.
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Based on this dataset, we run the following linear regression
log(fare)imt = αim + γt + β1HHImt + β2Subcontractingmt + β3LCCmt + imt. (2.8)
The dependent variable is the log of average ticket prices. Route-carrier fixed effects and time
fixed effects are controlled for. It should be noted that the error term mainly captures the
unexpected supply and demand shock affecting prices and is not related to the variables we
used to explain subcontracting network formation. We report the estimation results in Table
2.8. In the first column, we use no IV. This serves as a reference regression. We instrument
for Subcontractingmt in the second column. Both the weak identification test and the under
identification test for the IV are passed.29 In both columns, standard errors are robust
and clustered at route level. In both regressions the estimated signs of HHImt and LCCmt
are consistent with our expectations. A lower market concentration level or the presence
of a low-cost carrier is associated with lower ticket prices. Their coefficients are similar in
column 1 and 2 in terms of the magnitude and significance level. However, the coefficients of
Subcontractingmt are different. In the first column, Subcontractingmt is not significant and
the magnitude is relatively small. After being instrumented for, Subcontractingmt becomes
very significant (5% significance level), and the magnitude increases by more than 6 times.
As a causal effect, it indicates that major carriers’ subcontracting behavior is estimated to
decrease ticket prices by 3.4%.
29As we only have one IV, we cannot perform an over identification test.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study subcontracting network formations among US airline carriers. The
links in the network are subcontracting relationships between major carriers and regional
carriers. We use a Bayesian estimation method to study the factors that contribute to
the formation of a link in the network of carriers’ subcontracting relationships. We build
two models in which carriers make sequential decisions about not only their subcontracting
but also non-subcontracting relationships, enabling us to understand the interdependency
among airline carriers and decisions. In one model, we focus our attention on route entry
in subcontracting services, while in the other, we consider decision making among existing
major carriers on each route.
Our estimation results confirm the interdependency among carriers’ subcontracting and
non-subcontracting decisions. First, route presence, in every form, in the current period
significantly increase major carriers’ and regional carriers’ probabilities of subcontracting.
Second, for existing major carriers on a route in the current period, self-service and use
of subsidiaries are complementary to their subcontracting behaviors, while subcontracting
itself, code-sharing and “other-type” relationships are substitutes to other subcontracting
activity. Third, a major carrier is more likely to enter a route in subcontracting services or
subcontract to a regional carrier conditional on its route presence if its rivals have already
formed subcontracting relationships in the current period while regional carriers prefer to
avoid competition. In addition, we find that homophily and previously formed networks
have a significant impact on carriers’ current subcontracting network formations. Using the
IV constructed from the network formation estimation, we instrument for major carriers’
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subcontracting behaviors, and find that major carriers’ subcontracting decrease ticket prices
by 3.4%.
Finally, the paper highlights potential policy implications. Since subcontracting is related
to lower operation cost and decreases flight ticket prices, the formation of subcontracting
relationships could be facilitated and supported as a way to promote competition.
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Chapter 3
Carry-on Baggage Fee: Duopolistic
Price Discrimination with
Homogeneous Product
3.1 Introduction
Add-on pricing or ancillary pricing (a special case of price unbundling1) has become in-
creasingly popular. It happens when a firm charges a price for a main/base product and
an additional fee for an add-on/ancillary service. For example, airline carriers charge an
additional fee for carry-on baggage, seat assignment or class upgrading, separated from the
ticket price, hotels charge for internet service or breakfast, and car rental companies charge
1The difference between unbundled goods and an add-on is that goods after being unbundled can be sold
separately while add-ons cannot.
61
to add even spouses as additional drivers.2 In these industries, some firms charge for add-
ons while their competitors do not. For example, in the U.S. airline industry, Spirit Airlines
charges for every type of additional service while Southwest Airlines offer all services by
charging only one ticket price. In this paper, taking carry-on baggage fee as an example,
I aim at theoretically and empirically answering the question when a firm prices add-ons
under competition.3
Previous theoretical research provides some explanations for firms’ add-on pricing behav-
iors and can be divided into two trends.4 One trend focuses on add-on pricing by a monopoly
(Fruchter, Gerstner and Dobson, 2011; Shugan et al., 2017b; Cui, Duenyas and Sahin, 2018).
Although the monopoly assumption simplifies a model and provides insights from a certain
perspective, market competition also plays a significant role and is critical in answering
the proposed question in the paper. Another trend of research studies add-on pricing of
duopolists but with differentiated main products between firms, either horizontally differen-
tiated (Ellison, 2005) or vertically differentiated (Lin, 2017). Although the assumption of
product differentiation helps explain add-on pricing, a simpler assumption of homogeneous
product can offer an opportunity of discovering some novel observations. In addition, the
main products in some industries, such as the full-size cars provided by rental car compa-
nies, may not be too much differentiated, and thus the assumption of differentiated main
2Please see Shugan et al. (2017b) for more examples of add-on pricing.
3I take carry-on baggage fee as an example instead of other forms of add-on pricing because the carry-on
baggage fee is not small (usually about $20) and the empirical relationship can be identified with available
data.
4Scholars also discuss causes of add-on pricing from other perspectives, such as consumers’ unawareness
of add-on pricing (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Dahremo¨ller, 2013; Shulman and Geng, 2013) and online
platform’s distribution contract choice (Geng, Tan and Wei, 2018).
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product is not always appropriate. In the paper, incorporating both market competition and
homogenous main product, I build a model to understand add-on pricing.
The difficulty in modeling duopolistic/competitive add-on pricing with homogenous main
product can be explained as follows. Add-on pricing requires firms to compete in price.
However, in a Bertrand competition, firms undercut each other’s prices leading to price
(either the price of the main product or an add-on) equal to marginal cost. As a result, firms
should always charge for an add-on with a fee equal to its marginal cost. This theoretical
result contradicts the reality, where some firms charge for an add-on while others do not.
In my model, I counter this difficulty by assuming that firms compete in prices but with
precommitment of quantity/capacity.5 Under the assumption, firms compete in price and
can implement add-on pricing without equaling their prices to their marginal costs. This
assumption is also appropriate in the airline industry, where airlines first schedule their
flights months in advance (precommitment of quantity/capacity) and then set their prices
(compete in price).6
In the paper, I take a third-degree price discrimination approach to understand firms’
add-on pricing. In the theoretical model, two firms compete in both the high-end market
(passengers with carry-on baggage or carry-on passengers) and the low-end market (passen-
gers without carry-on baggage or non-carry-on passengers) with homogenous main service.7
5This assumption is not uncommon. The equilibrium under price competition with precommitment of
quantities is first introduced by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Shugan et al. (2017b) also assume that a
firm sets quantities before prices in their monopoly model.
6Although airlines are well known for their differentiated qualities of their main services and I assume
homogeneous main product in my model, the differentiation part can be incorporated into the model easily
after one understands the basic model.
7The “homogenous” means the main service provided by two firms are homogeneous. It does not imply
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A firm may use add-on pricing as a tool to distinguish passengers across markets and charge
separate prices.8 The other firm with uniform pricing can match the firm’s price in either the
high-end or the low-end market. The add-on pricing firm’s decision of charging a carry-on
baggage fee depends on the best response of the uniform pricing firm. Only when the uniform
pricing firm prefers matching the price in the high-end market, the add-on pricing firm is
willing to charge a carry-on baggage fee. The theoretical results suggest that add-on pricing
depends on passengers’ distribution and it is more likely to be adopted when non-carry-on
passengers have low willingness to pays (WTPs) or the fraction of non-carry-on passengers
is small. The result is intuitive since the uniform pricing firm is more likely to match the
price in the high-end market giving up the low-end market if the low-end market is not
profitable compared to the high-end market (low WTPs of non-carry-on passengers) or it is
not important (small fraction of non-carry-on passengers).
In the paper, I also test these theoretical results using the publicly available data from the
U.S. airline industry. The theory indicates that it is the change of passengers’ distribution
that results in a carrier’s adoption of the carry-on baggage fee, namely the decrease in
the WTPs and the fraction of non-carry-on passengers. I argue that this decrease can be
reflected by the decrease in the skewness of airline ticket price distribution. Using both panel
regression and survival analysis, I provide some evidence showing a negative relationship
between ticket price skewness and the adoption of carry-on baggage fee, which supports my
theoretical results.
that services with and without carry-on are homogeneous.
8The firm charges the ticket price to non-carry-on passengers and the ticket price & baggage fee to
carry-on passengers.
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The paper contributes to the literature in many ways. First, it adds to the duopolistic
third-degree price discrimination theories. Previous research on competitive third-degree
price discrimination requires differentiated products (Stole, 2007; Adachi and Fabinger, 2019;
Chen, Li and Schwartz, 2019).9 In the paper, the assumption of price competition with
quantity precommitment allows the model to analyze competitive price discrimination with
homogeneous product.
Second, it contributes to the add-on pricing theories. As I stated in the beginning,
research on add-on pricing either assumes monopoly or duopoly but with product differen-
tiation. My work studying duopolistic add-on pricing with homogeneous product sheds new
light on explaining add-on pricing. Particularly, it explains why some carriers price add-on
when others do not. In this area, the paper is most closely related to three recent works (Lin,
2017; Shugan et al., 2017b; Cui, Duenyas and Sahin, 2018). Lin (2017) explains why higher-
quality firms price add-on but not lower-quality firms and Shugan et al. (2017b) explain
why carriers price add-on to economy class passengers but not first class. However, neither
explains why lower-quality airlines such as Spirit, Frontier and Allegiant charged carry-on
baggage fee when the higher-quality carriers such as American and United did not.10 Cui,
9Stole (2007) discusses competitive price discrimination in a model of quantity competition with homoge-
nous product, but the assumption of quantity competition is not appropriate in studying price discrimination.
Chen, Li and Schwartz (2019) also studies homogenous product but by introducing cost asymmetry.
10Lin (2017) explains add-on pricing in a vertical differentiated product setting: higher-quality hotels price
internet as a tool of price discrimination while lower-quality hotels provide internet for free to attract business
from higher-quality hotels. Shugan et al. (2017b) show that airlines bundle first-class but not economy-class
in order to make the services in these two classes more differentiated. In terms of carry-on baggage fee, their
theory explains why legacy carriers such as American and United around 2017 began to charge a carry-on
baggage fee to their basic economy passengers while still bundled carry-on for their upper-level classes.
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Duenyas and Sahin (2018) discuss how a firm’s add-on pricing can be affected by its ability
to price discriminate main product and implies that airlines which can perform price discrim-
ination between business travelers and leisure travelers should price add-on if passengers are
less likely to purchase it. This is consistent with some of my findings. However, my model
does not need to distinguish between business travelers and leisure travelers and also takes
market competition into account.
Third, the paper provides empirical evidence for the cause of add-on pricing. Most
empirical add-on pricing research focuses on the impact of add-on pricing, such as the impact
on the firm’s own price (Brueckner et al., 2015; Kim, Liu and Rupp, 2019), on rivals’ prices
(He, Kim and Liu, 2019) and on product quality (Nicolae et al., 2017). The exception is
Shugan et al. (2017b), who empirically show a relationship between product differentiation
and bundling. Unlike their work focusing on product differentiation, my paper provides some
evidence to support a negative relationship between price skewness (reflecting passenger
distribution) and add-on pricing.
Last, the paper contributes to the literature in the airline industry. On the one hand,
it proposes a theoretical framework of price competition with precommitment of quantity,
providing a new perspective for future theoretical research on the competition in the airline
industry. On the other hand, it empirically shows that the third moment (skewness) of ticket
price distributions also provides economic insights besides the first moment, average price
(Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Snider and Williams, 2015), and the second moment, price
dispersion (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai, Liu and Serfes, 2014; Kim and Shen, 2017).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 builds the theoretical model and
derives the results. I discuss the empirical evidence in Section 3.3 and conclude in Section
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3.4.
3.2 Theoretical Model
Assume there are two types of passengers on a route: the low-type passenger never bringing
a carry-on bag and the high-type passenger always bringing a carry-on bag.11 As a result,
there are two segmented markets: the low-end market of non-carry-on passengers and the
high-end market of carry-on passengers. A passenger’ willingness to pay (WTP) for a flight
ticket in the low-end market, Market L, is vL and that in the high-end market, Market H,
is vH .
12 vL ∼ U(0, a) and vH ∼ U(0, 1), where a < 1 indicating non-carry-on passengers in
general have lower WTPs than carry-on passengers. The total mass of passengers on the
route is 1, with a fraction of α non-carry-on passengers and 1−α carry-on passengers. Two
firms, firm 1 and firm 2, provide flight services to the route. The game has three stages.
Stage 1 Firm 1 decides whether to charge a carry-on baggage fee or not.
Stage 2 Both firms schedule their flights by setting their flight capacities x1 and x2
simultaneously.
Stage 3 Under the constraints of x1 and x2, firms compete in price simultaneously.
All decisions made in each stage are observable to both firms. Since I aim at explaining
why a firm has an incentive to deviate from uniform pricing under competition, only firm 1
is allowed to charge for a carry-on baggage fee. In other words, I do not consider the case
11In the current model, I do not assume that passengers can switch from bringing a carry-on to not
brining one or vice versa. Incorporating passengers’ such behaviors only introduces complexity without
adding further insights. The main results will not change if I allow passengers to decide whether to bring a
carry-on or not.
12vH also includes the passenger’s WTP for a carry-on baggage.
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when both firms charge the fee. The underlying assumption is that firm 2’s switching cost of
charging a carry-on baggage fee is too large that it never considers doing so. Each flight seat
scheduled in Stage 2 entails a marginal cost of c.13 There is no fixed cost for flight capacity
and no cost for a carry-on either.
The demand in Market L is
DL(pL) = α(1− pL
a
),
and that in Market H is
DH(pH) = (1− α)(1− pH).
Following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), if the market demand is D(p), two firms’ quantities
demanded given x1 and x2 are as follows.
I. p1 < p2
q1 = min(x1, D(p1)).
q2 = min(x2,max(0, D(p2)− x1)).
II. p1 = p2 = p
q1 = min(x1,
D(p)
2
+ max(0,
D(p)
2
− x2)).
q2 = min(x2,
D(p)
2
+ max(0,
D(p)
2
− x1)).
I also assume that the market with a lower price will be cleared first, indicating Market L
13The marginal cost c is introduced to make sure that there is only one pure strategy equilibrium in the
subgame of quantity competition.
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should be cleared before Market H.
3.2.1 No Baggage Fee
In the first scenario, no firm charges a separate baggage fee. Each firm charges a uniform
price across both markets and the combined market demand is
D(p) = α(1− p
a
) + (1− α)(1− p) = 1− φp,
where φ = α
a
+ 1− α.
Property 1 The subgame of no baggage fee results in a Cournot equilibrium outcome.
Please see Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) for details of the proof that price competition
with precommitment of quantity results in a Cournot equilibrium outcome. The intuition is
straightforward. Stage 3 mimics a Bertrand game in which both firms undercut each other’s
prices. It differs from a Bertrand game in the way that the equilibrium price in Stage 3 lowers
to D−1(x1 + x2) instead of marginal cost. At the price of D−1(x1 + x2), firms’ capacities
are used up and no firm has the incentive to lower its price further. A lower price will not
result in a larger quantity since the quantity is already restricted by each firm’s capacity.
Therefore, the game is determined by quantities and a quantity (capacity) competition in
Stage 2 will lead to a Cournot equilibrium outcome. As a result, the equilibrium capacities,
prices and profits when no firm charges a baggage fee are as follows. The superscription nb
indicates the case of no baggage fee.
xnb1 = x
nb
2 =
1− φc
3
.
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pnb1 = p
nb
2 =
1 + 2cφ
3φ
.
pinb1 = pi
nb
2 =
(1− cφ)2
9φ
. (3.1)
3.2.2 Firm 1 Charges a Baggage Fee
This section investigates the case when firm 1 decides to charge a carry-on baggage fee in
Stage 1. The game changes in Stage 3. Given x1 and x2, firm 1 decides p1L in Market L and
p1H in Market H and firm 2 p2 simultaneously. Firm 1’s two prices will lead to its baggage
fee b = p1H − p1L ≥ 0, which requires
p1H ≥ p1L. (3.2)
Property 2 The subgame of firm 1 charging a carry-on baggage fee results in a Cournot
equilibrium outcome in either the combined market or the high-end market.
Both firms undercut each other’s prices in Stage 3. However, with a uniform price, firm
2 needs to decide to undercut which one between firm 1’s two prices. On the one hand, firm
2 can choose to undercut firm 1’s price in Market L so that firm 2 can serve both Market L
and Market H. In the equilibrium in Market L, p1L = p2. p2 = p1L ≤ p1H also forces firm 1
to lower its price in Market H until p1H = p2 = p1L so that firm 1 can also be competitive
in Market H. In such a case, by setting p1L = p1H , firm 1 charges a uniform price resulting
in the same equilibrium as in the case of no carry-on baggage fee: two firms form a Cournot
equilibrium in the combined market. On the other hand, firm 2 can choose to undercut firm
1’s price in Market H until p2 = p1H . By doing so, firm 2 gives up serving Market L and
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only focuses on Market H. In such a case, two firms form a Cournot equilibrium in Market H
while Market L is served by firm 1 only. The equilibrium outcome in the subgame depends
on firm 2’s best response: firm 2 can “match” firm 1’s price either in market H (p2 = p1H)
or in market L (p1L = p2 = p1H).
3.2.2.1 Firm 2 Matching Price in Market H
When firm 2 decides to give up Market L and only compete in Market H, firm 1 and firm 2
play a subgame of price competition with precommitment of capacity in Market H. This leads
to a Cournot equilibrium outcome in Market H. This requires p2 = p1H = D
−1
H (x1H + x2),
where x1H = x1 − DL(p1L) and DL(p1L) is firm 1’s equilibrium quantity in Market L. The
Cournot equilibrium prices, quantities and profits in Market H are
p2 = p1H =
1 + 2c
3
, q2 = q1H =
1
3
(1− α)(1− c), pi2 = pi1H = (1− α)(1− c)
2
9
.
Firm 1 dominates Market L without competition from firm 2. Firm 1’s price p1L depends
on whether the monopoly price in Market L (pmL =
a+c
2
) is larger or smaller than firm 1’s
Cournot price in Market H (p1H =
1+2c
3
).
If pmL ≤ p1H ⇐⇒ a ≤ 2+c3 , firm 1 charges the monopoly price, sells monopoly quantity
and receives monopoly profit in Market L.
p1L =
a+ c
2
, q1L =
α(a− c)
2a
, pi1L =
α(a− c)2
4a
.
If pmL > p1H ⇐⇒ a > 2+c3 , firm 1 cannot charge the monopoly price since p1L cannot
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be higher than p1H , which is smaller than p
m
L . As a result, firm 1 charges a price as high as
possible, namely, p1L = p1H − , where  is an amount small enough. For the simplicity of
calculation, we ignore  and have the following equilibrium outcome in Market L.
p1L =
1 + 2c
3
, q1L = α(1− 1 + 2c
3a
), pi1L =
α(3a− 1− 2c)(1− c)
9a
.
In summary, when firm 1 charges a baggage fee and firm 2’s best response is matching
firm 1’s price in Market H, both firms’ profits are as follows.
pibfH1 =

α(a−c)2
4a
+ (1−α)(1−c)
2
9
if a ≤ 2+c
3
α(3a−1−2c)(1−c)
9a
+ (1−α)(1−c)
2
9
if a > 2+c
3
, pibfH2 =
(1− α)(1− c)2
9
. (3.3)
Firm 1 sets x1 = q1L + q1H and firm 2 sets x2 = q2H in Stage 2. In Stage 3, firm 1 sets p1L in
the low-end market, which is cleared first, leaving available capacity x1 − q1L to Market H.
Firm 1 and firm 2 form a Cournot equilibrium in Market H, resulting in equilibrium prices
of p1H = p2.
3.2.2.2 Firm 2 Matching Price in Market L
If firm 2 undercuts firm 1’s price in Market L, the equilibrium in Market L requires p2 = p1L.
In addition, firm 2 forces firm 1 to undercut firm 2’s uniform price in Market H, leading to
p1H = p2. As a result, both firm 1 and firm 2 charge uniform prices, resulting in the same
equilibrium as that in the case of no baggage fee. When firm 1 plans to charge a carry-on
baggage fee and firm 2’s best response is matching price in Market L, two firms’ equilibrium
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prices, capacities and profits are as follows .
pbfL1 = p
bfL
2 =
1 + 2cφ
3φ
.
xbfL1 = x
bfL
2 =
1− φc
3
.
pibfL1 =
(1− cφ)2
9φ
, pibfL2 =
(1− cφ)2
9φ
. (3.4)
3.2.3 Equilibrium
In this section, I derive the equilibrium of the whole game. In order to simplify the calculation
and derive intuitive results without loss of generalization, I assume c is close to zero and is
ignored when I derive the numerical conditions. Especially, I am interested in the conditions
when firm 1 charges a carry-on baggage fee.
Property 3 The smaller a or α is, the more likely it is for firm 1 to charge a carry-on
baggage fee.
Firm 1 charges a carry-on baggage fee when the baggage fee increases firm 1’s profit, and
firm 1’s profit of charging baggage fee depends on firm 2’s best response. When pibfL2 > pi
bfH
2 ,
firm 2 matches the price in Market L. Firm 1 does not choose to charge a baggage fee since
p1L = p1H and this is the same as b = 0. When pi
bfL
2 ≤ pibfH2 , firm 2 matches price in Market
H. Firm 1 charges a carry-on baggage fee only if pibfH1 ≥ pinb1 , which is always true. As a
result, the condition for firm 1 to charge a carry-on baggage fee is when firm 2 matches the
price in Market H, namely, pibfL2 ≤ pibfH2 . The numerical solution of pibfL2 ≤ pibfH2 is illustrated
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by the area of Baggage Fee in Figure 3.1.14 If (a, α) ∈ Baggage Fee, firm 1 will choose to
charge a carry-on baggage fee. One can see that the smaller a or α is, the more likely it is
for firm 1 to charge for a carry-on bag.
The results are intuitive. If firm 1 charges separate prices in two markets, firm 2 has two
options, either matching the price in the low-end market serving both markets or matching
the price in the high-end market only serving the high-end market. Firm 1 is willing to
practice price discrimination only when firm 2 chooses the second option, giving up the
low-end market. If passengers in the low-end market have low WTPs (smaller a) or the
low-end market has a small fraction of total passengers (smaller α), firm 2 will be more
willing to ignore the low-end market since the market is not profitable with smaller a and
not important with smaller α. Therefore, firm 1 is more likely to charge a carry-on baggage
fee.
3.3 Empirical Evidence
Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data provides flight ticket information that
can be used to examine the above derived theoretical results. In this section, I test the
conditions under which a firm charges a separate carry-on baggage fee, namely that non-
carry-on passengers have low WTPs and take up a small proportion of total passengers.
More specifically, I aim at testing whether a decrease in non-carry-on passengers’ WTPs
and their fraction is related to the adoption of a carry-on baggage fee. Unfortunately, one
14The area also includes another trivial case, in which a is so small that both firms give up serving Market
L even when neither firm charges a baggage fee. In this trivial case, firm 1 has the incentive to charge a
baggage fee, while firm 2, of course, will not match the price in Market L.
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cannot observe passengers’ WTPs or whether passengers bring carry-on baggage or not. The
data only records the purchased flight ticket prices and price distributions. The following
property links the gap between the theory and the observables.
Property 4 A decrease in non-carry-on passengers’ WTPs and their fraction can be re-
flected by a decrease in the skewness of flight ticket price distributions.
First, the decrease in non-carry-on passengers’ WTPs should be reflected by the decrease
in non-carry-on passengers’ ticket prices. Although passengers’ WTP distributions are not
the price distributions, the change in the former, the demand side of the market, must be
reflected by the change in the latter, the combined results from the forces of both supply
and demand. Second, as I assumed in the theoretical model, a non-carry-on passenger, in
general, has a smaller WTP than a carry-on passenger and thus non-carry-on passengers
should be distributed more toward the left part of the distribution. So a decrease in non-
carry-on passengers’ WTPs should result in a decrease in the lower level price percentiles in
the price distribution. In other words, the price distribution should be stretched longer at
the left when non-carry-on passengers’ WTPs decrease. Similarly, a decrease in the fraction
of non-carry-on passengers should result in a lower density of the lower level percentile ticket
prices in the price distribution. In other words, the density of the price distribution at
the left becomes smaller. In summary, the decrease in non-carry-on passengers’ WTPs and
their fraction can be reflected by the change in the price distribution: the price distribution
is stretched longer at the left and become thinner at the left. Following the change, the
distribution is more skewed to the left and its skewness is decreased. Figure 3.2 illustrates
an imaginary example of a decrease in non-carry-on passengers’ WTPs and their fraction
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reflected by the change in price distribution. It shows the change in the distribution if it is
stretched longer at the left and becomes thinner at the left, resulting in a decrease in the
distribution’s skewness.
If the decrease in non-carry-on passengers’ WTPs and their fraction causes the adoption
of the carry-on baggage fee as shown by the theoretical model and such a decrease can be
reflected by the decrease in the skewness of flight ticket price distribution empirically, we
have the following testable result.
Testable Result There is a negative relationship between the skewness of an airline carrier’s
ticket price distribution and its adoption of a carry-on baggage fee.
3.3.1 Empirical Model
To test the result, I use two empirical methods: panel regression with fixed effects and
survival analysis. The panel regression has the following intuition. If there is a negative
relationship between the price skewness and the adoption of a carry-on baggage fee, there
should be a decreasing trend in a carrier’s price skewness before it charged the carry-on
baggage fee but not for a carrier which did not do it. Therefore, I consider the following
empirical model,
Skewnessijt = β0 +β1TimeTrendt+β2BFCarrieri×TimeTrendt+β3HHI+αij +θq+ijt.
(3.5)
Skewnessijt is the sample skewness of carrier i’s price distribution on market j in period
t. TimeTrend is the time trend. αij is carrier-market fixed effect and θq seasonal (quarter)
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fixed effect.15 BFCarrier is a dummy indicating that carrier i is a carry-on baggage fee
carrier, a carrier which began to charge the fee during the sample period. I am interested in
β2 which captures the difference in the trend of price skewness between carry-on baggage fee
carriers and other carriers. HHI is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, capturing the market
competition level and controlling for the supply shock. The relationship between HHI and
Skewness itself is also interesting, which has not been studied before either theoretically
or empirically. Since the price skewness will be affected after a carrier charges a carry-on
baggage fee, I drop all the observations for the carry-on baggage fee carriers after they charge
the fee. In addition, after a carrier implemented the baggage fee policy, it can also enter other
routes and the post-baggage-fee entry will bias the time trend in the baggage fee carriers’
price skewness. Therefore, the entire route is dropped if a baggage fee carrier entered it after
charging the fee.
I also consider the following empirical model,
Skewnessijt = β0 + β1TimeTrendt + β2HHI + αij + θq + ijt. (3.6)
I run this model only using the sample of carry-on baggage fee carriers. TimeTrendt in
the model only captures the time trend in the price skewness of carry-on baggage fee carriers.
I expect the coefficient to be negative.
Survival analysis (duration analysis) provides a tool to study what causes the occurance
15Since I include a time trend, I cannot control for time (year-quarter) fixed effect but only seasonal
(quarter) fixed effect.
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of an event, in my case carry-on baggage fee. I consider the following model,
BaggageFeeit = β0 + β1SkewnessMeanij + β2SkewnessDevijt + ijt. (3.7)
BaggageFeeit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if carrier i began to charge carry-on baggage
fee in period t+ 1.16 The variable indicates that the event (implementation of carry-on bag-
gage fee) happens for the carrier. Since survival analysis uses a maximum likelihood estima-
tion method, fixed effects will be biased and cannot be used. Instead, I use SkewnessMeanij,
the mean of skewness for carrier i on route j cross all periods and SkewnessDevijt, the de-
viation in each period from the mean. I am interested in β2, which captures the relationship
between the price skewness and the implementation of carry-on baggage fee.
3.3.2 Data
DB1B data records 10% domestic flight tickets purchased quarterly. It provides information
such as year, quarter, origin, destination, carrier, flight distance, passenger number and ticket
price. A period in the sample is a quarter. I define a market as a directional nonstop route
from one airport to another. Three airline carriers began to charge a carry-on baggage fee
and applied the policy change to all their routes: Spirit Airlines in August 2010, Allegiant
Airlines in April 2012, and Frontier in April 2014. I include the periods from the first
quarter in 2007 to the fourth quarter in 2015 in the sample. In 2017, legacy carriers, such as
American Airlines and United Airlines, also began to charge a carry-on baggage fee to their
16Note that periods after the carrier charges the baggage fee are dropped. This is the last period a
carry-on baggage fee carrier exists in the sample.
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basic economy class passengers, but they charge the baggage fee on selected routes which
cannot be observed. In order to avoid the complexity brought by legacy carriers, I do not use
the data after 2015. For each carrier in a market in a period, there is a distribution of ticket
prices purchased. I aggregate the data to carrier-route-quarter level, obtaining variables
such as passenger numbers, ticket fare mean, ticket fare standard deviation and ticket fare
skewness. As stated in Section 3.3.1, I drop the periods for carry-on baggage fee carriers after
they implement the policy as well as the entire routes they enter after their introduction of
carry-on baggage fee. After cleaning the data, I obtain a sample of 36 quarters, 2023 markets
and 24 carriers.17
Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of the sample. There are a lot of variations in
these variables. The mean of the key variable Skewness is 0.57, indicating that carriers’
price distributions on average are right-skewed. The minimum and maximum are −3 and
4.65 with a standard deviation of 0.58. There are only a tiny fraction of observations with
BaggageFee equal to 1. The number of these observations is 177, indicating the three carry-
on baggage fee carriers operated on 177 markets before they charged a carry-on baggage fee.
3.3.3 Emperical Results
Table 3.2 presents the results of the panel regressions. Column (1) shows the results from
the specification stated in Equation 3.5, for which all sample is used. The negative and
significant coefficient of BFCarrier×TimeTrend suggests that before they charged the fee
carry-on baggage fee carriers saw a decreasing trend in their price skewness compared with
17The Appendix describes how the data is cleaned in details.
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the carriers which did not charge the fee. Column (2)-(5) present the results of Equation
3.6, for which only observations from carry-on baggage fee carriers are used. Column (2)
shows the results for all three carriers and Column (3)-(5) those of each carrier separately.
The negative and significant coefficients of TimeTrend suggest that there was a decreasing
trend in these carriers’ price skewness before they charged the carry-on baggage fee. These
empirical results provide some evidence that a decrease in carriers’ price skewness may lead
to their adoption of a carry-on baggage fee.
Another interesting observation is that the coefficients of HHI are positive (and signifi-
cant if the sample size is large enough). This means that carriers in a market with higher
concentration level have higher price skewness, namely, that the price distribution is more
right-skewed. In other words, carriers focus more on (sell more tickets to) passengers at
lower-level prices in a market with lower competition level. This topic is not the focus of the
paper, but it deserves further research in the future.
Table 3.3 presents the results of survival regressions. Different distributions for the
survival regressions are used in the three columns. The coefficients of SkewnessDevijt are
negative and significant at 10% significance level for all three columns, indicating price
skewness negatively explains carriers’ adoption of the carry-on baggage fee. These regressions
further provide some evidence that the carry-on baggage fee is caused by the change in
passengers’ distributions.
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3.4 Conclusion
In order to explain firms’ add-on pricing decisions, I take a third-degree price discrimination
approach, assume that firms compete in price with precommitment of quantity, and thus am
able to incorporate both market competition and homogeneous main product into the model.
This contributes to the literature in the theory of add-on pricing as well as the literature in
competitive third-degree price discrimination. In the model, two firms compete in both the
high-end market (carry-on passengers) and the low-end market (non-carry-on passengers).
A firm may use add-on pricing as a tool to distinguish passengers across markets and charge
separate prices. The other firm with uniform pricing can match the firm’s price in either the
high-end or the low-end market. The add-on pricing firm’s decision of charging a carry-on
baggage fee depends on the best response of the uniform pricing firm. Only when the uniform
pricing firm prefers matching the price in the high-end market, the add-on pricing firm is
willing to charge a carry-on baggage fee. The theoretical result suggests that add-on pricing
depends on passengers’ distribution and it is more likely to be adopted when non-carry-on
passengers have low willingness to pays (WTPs) or the fraction of non-carry-on passengers
is small. The result is intuitive since the uniform pricing firm is more likely to match the
price in the high-end market giving up the low-end market if the low-end market is not
profitable compared to the high-end market (low WTPs of non-carry-on passengers) or it is
not important (small fraction of non-carry-on passengers).
The paper also contributes to the empirical research on add-on pricing and empirical
research in the airline industry. I test these theoretical results using the publicly available
data from the U.S. airline industry. The theory indicates that it is the change of passengers’
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distribution that results in a carrier’s adoption of the carry-on baggage fee, namely the
decrease in the WTPs and the fraction of non-carry-on passengers. I argue that this decrease
can be reflected by the decrease in the skewness of airline ticket price distribution. Using
both panel regression and survival analysis, I provide some evidence showing a negative
relationship between ticket price skewness and the adoption of carry-on baggage fee, which
supports my theoretical results.
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Figures
Chapter 1 Figures
Figure 1.1: Prices of Spirit and Non-Spirit Market
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Notes: This graph plots prices of Spirit and Non-Spirit Market before and after the policy.
The vertical line represents the time when Spirit begins to charge carry-on baggage fee.
The Spirit Market is the directional non-stop route from Detroit Airport to Orlando Airport.
The Non-Spirit Market is the directional non-stop route from Buffalo Airpor to Orlando Airport.
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Chapter 2 Figures
Figure 2.1: Subcontracting Networks over Time
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(a) Subcontracting Network in 2013q3
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(b) Subcontracting Network in 2014q3
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(c) Subcontracting Network in 2015q3
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(d) Subcontracting Network in 2016q3
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(e) Subcontracting Network in 2017q3
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Figure 2.2: Major, Regional and Link Numbers over Time
.
5
.
55
.
6
.
65
.
7
.
75
Av
er
ag
e 
Nu
m
be
r
2013q3 2014q3 2015q3 2016q3 2017q3
Time
Average Major Number Average Regional Number
Average Link Number
Major, Regional and Link Numbers over Time
Figure 2.3: Major Carriers Subcontracting Route Numbers over Time
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Figure 2.4: Selected Regional Carriers Subcontracting Route Numbers over Time
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Figure 2.5: ExpressJet and SkyWest Route Networks over Time
(a) ExpressJet Route Network in 2013q3 (b) SkyWest Route Network in 2013q3
(c) ExpressJet Route Network in 2015q3 (d) SkyWest Route Network in 2015q3
(e) ExpressJet Route Network in 2017q3 (f) SkyWest Route Network in 2017q3
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Chapter 3 Figures
Figure 3.1: Conditions of a and α for Firm 1 to Charge a Carry-on Baggage Fee
Baggage Fee
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
a
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
97
Figure 3.2: An Imaginary Example of a Decrease in Non-carry-on Passengers’ WTPs and
Their Fraction Reflected by the Change in Price Distribution
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Chapter 1 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Ob Mean SD Min Max
SpiritMkt (Treated Group)
Distance 1078 949.814 378.074 177.000 1750.000
Carrier Passenger number 1078 1120.019 1114.552 5.000 5984.000
Market Passenger number 1078 3649.479 2544.447 65.000 12408.000
Carrier Enplanement 1078 2919.803 3123.487 5.000 17545.000
Carrier Average Ticket Price 1078 153.531 54.333 44.708 510.706
Carrier 20 Percentile Ticket Price 1078 94.427 30.984 20.000 203.500
Carrier 50 Percentile Ticket Price 1078 138.340 45.858 39.755 383.010
Carrier 80 Percentile Ticket Price 1078 206.046 84.166 45.000 848.510
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 1078 0.474 0.105 0.251 0.959
Subcontracting 1078 0.055 0.228 0.000 1.000
Notes: The variables are summarized at route-carrier-quarter level for the sample of the treated
and the whole control groups.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics (Continued)
Ob Mean SD Min Max
NonSpiritMkt (Control Group)
Distance 27160 914.608 548.330 73.000 2565.000
Carrier Passenger number 27160 598.144 718.532 5.000 7996.000
Market Passenger number 27160 1666.773 1536.330 7.000 13580.000
Carrier Enplanement 27160 2447.581 2499.488 5.000 20701.000
Carrier Average Ticket Price 27160 203.346 70.205 19.510 708.008
Carrier 20 Percentile Ticket Price 27160 126.032 39.513 10.010 606.960
Carrier 50 Percentile Ticket Price 27160 179.104 61.161 19.510 897.010
Carrier 80 Percentile Ticket Price 27160 277.454 113.084 19.510 1133.120
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 27160 0.560 0.166 0.218 0.999
Subcontracting 27160 0.325 0.469 0.000 1.000
All Routes
Distance 28238 915.952 542.849 73.000 2565.000
Carrier Passenger number 28238 618.067 744.284 5.000 7996.000
Market Passenger number 28238 1742.464 1631.406 7.000 13580.000
Carrier Enplanement 28238 2465.608 2527.693 5.000 20701.000
Carrier Average Ticket Price 28238 201.445 70.316 19.510 708.008
Carrier 20 Percentile Ticket Price 28238 124.825 39.686 10.010 606.960
Carrier 50 Percentile Ticket Price 28238 177.548 61.148 19.510 897.010
Carrier 80 Percentile Ticket Price 28238 274.728 112.948 19.510 1133.120
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 28238 0.557 0.165 0.218 0.999
Subcontracting 28238 0.315 0.465 0.000 1.000
Notes: The variables are summarized at route-carrier-quarter level for the sample of the treated
and the whole control groups.
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Table 1.2: Summary Stats (Mean) by Groups
Treated Group Control Group Matched Group
Top1Share 0.576 0.680 0.577
Top2Share 0.329 0.272 0.315
Top3Share 0.083 0.044 0.096
Passengers 3269.650 1481.198 2650.085
Enplanement 8590.278 6019.711 8454.314
LCC 0.528 0.617 0.644
AvgFare 146.439 198.005 168.293
SmallPop 3.234 2.350 2.752
LargePop 7.520 7.398 7.077
Distance 900.600 884.188 815.942
Observations 180 5448 624
Notes: These are variables used in matching, summarized at route-
quarter level for the periods before Spirit’s baggage fee.
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Table 1.3: Common Trend Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.100 -0.121 0.416 -0.448 -16.43
(0.554) (0.392) (0.595) (0.756) (99.87)
TimeTrend 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 5.447∗∗∗
(0.00483) (0.00538) (0.00552) (0.00595) (0.868)
SptMkt× TimeTrend -0.00222 -0.00481 -0.00724 0.00412 -0.739
(0.00962) (0.00704) (0.00867) (0.0121) (1.815)
Observations 1672 1672 1672 1672 1672
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Clusters 130 130 130 130 130
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Results are from the sample of the treated and the variable matched groups in the periods
before Spirit’s baggage fee. Additional controls include merger dummies. Merging carriers are
dropped during their merging process. IV are used for HHI. IV tests are passed.
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Table 1.4: Change in Spirit’s Own Prices before and after the Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.0255 0.163 0.00925 -0.0621 -12.90
(0.162) (0.215) (0.188) (0.152) (14.04)
Policy -0.0438 -0.0959∗∗∗ -0.0676∗∗ -0.0393 -5.281
(0.0355) (0.0336) (0.0299) (0.0320) (3.750)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360
Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Clusters 30 30 30 30 30
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Results are from the sample of Spirit Airline itself. Additional controls include merger
dummies.
103
Table 1.5: Effects of Spirit’s Policy on Competing Carriers’ Price Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.834∗∗ 0.870∗∗ 1.099∗∗ 0.984∗ 110.6
(0.405) (0.428) (0.460) (0.515) (71.75)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0576∗∗ -0.0552∗∗ -0.0734∗∗ -0.0457 -10.32∗∗
(0.0285) (0.0251) (0.0313) (0.0386) (5.147)
Observations 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Clusters 134 134 134 134 134
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Results are from the sample of the treated and the variable matched groups. Additional
controls include merger dummies. Merging carriers are dropped during their merging process.
IV are used for HHI. IV tests are passed.
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Table 1.6: Summary Statistics (Mean): Legacy Carriers vs. LCCs
Low-Cost Carriers Legacy Carriers
j level
Distance 943.772 830.838
jt level
HHI 0.437 0.479
Market Passenger number 3578.856 2768.105
ijt level
Carrier Passenger number 1145.160 877.695
Carrier Enplanement 2687.659 3297.900
Carrier Average Ticket Price 151.005 185.462
Carrier 20 Percentile Ticket Price 100.998 116.361
Carrier 50 Percentile Ticket Price 139.383 165.317
Carrier 80 Percentile Ticket Price 197.673 248.787
Observations 1026 1840
Notes: The variables are summarized at route-carrier-quarter level for the sample
of treated and variable matched groups.
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Table 1.7: Effects of Spirit’s Policy on Competing Carriers’ Prices: Legacy vs. LCC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.750∗ 0.862∗∗ 1.064∗∗ 0.836 86.44
(0.386) (0.393) (0.427) (0.512) (69.99)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0733∗∗ -0.0730∗∗∗ -0.0919∗∗ -0.0566 -13.03∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0275) (0.0359) (0.0451) (5.827)
Policy × LCC -0.0803∗∗∗ -0.0933∗∗∗ -0.0917∗∗∗ -0.0838∗∗∗ -14.36∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0206) (0.0201) (0.0217) (2.975)
SptMkt× Policy × LCC 0.0682 0.0795∗∗ 0.0831∗ 0.0384 11.42
(0.0445) (0.0338) (0.0471) (0.0659) (8.782)
Observations 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Clusters 134 134 134 134 134
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Results are from the sample of the treated and the variable matched groups. Additional
controls include merger dummies. Merging carriers are dropped during their merging process. IV
are used for HHI. IV tests are passed.
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Table 1.8: Summary Statistics (Mean): NonSubcontracting vs. Subcontracting
NonSubcontracting Routes Subcontracting Routes
j level
Distance 1075.637 630.996
jt level
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.447 0.500
Market Passenger number 3641.144 2409.890
ijt level
Carrier Passenger number 1115.051 778.946
Carrier Enplanement 3058.492 3397.021
Carrier Average Ticket Price 175.821 179.820
Carrier 20 Percentile Ticket Price 114.377 109.701
Carrier 50 Percentile Ticket Price 158.689 159.436
Carrier 80 Percentile Ticket Price 231.795 244.880
Observations 1295 699
Notes: The variables are summarized at route-carrier-quarter level for the sample of treated and
variable matched groups. On routes where some carriers subcontract, carriers which do not sub-
contract are dropped. However, a subcontracting carrier may also operate its own flights on the
same route. Due to aggregated nature of ticket price data, tickets from major carriers’ own flights
and those from subcontracting flights are grouped together.
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Table 1.9: Effects of Spirit’s Policy on Competing Carriers’ Prices: Subcontracting vs.
Non-subcontracting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.0690 -0.241 0.241 0.0581 91.94
(0.251) (0.197) (0.238) (0.387) (65.91)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0386∗ -0.0440∗∗ -0.0447∗ -0.0211 -4.088
(0.0232) (0.0205) (0.0241) (0.0352) (5.164)
Policy × Subcontracting 0.0445∗∗∗ 0.0223 0.0571∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗ 11.45∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0225) (0.0194) (0.0195) (3.566)
SptMkt× Policy × Subcontracting -0.126∗∗∗ -0.104∗ -0.113∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ -25.61∗∗∗
(0.0338) (0.0579) (0.0309) (0.0549) (7.579)
Observations 1963 1963 1963 1963 1963
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Clusters 133 133 133 133 133
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Results are from the sample of the treated and the variable matched groups. Nonsubcontracting
carriers on subcontracting routes are dropped. Additional controls include merger dummies. Merging
carriers are dropped during their merging process. IV are used for HHI. IV tests are passed.
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Table 1.10: Falsification Test: Fake Treatment Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.986∗ 0.317 1.130∗ 1.361∗∗ 154.1∗
(0.510) (0.329) (0.592) (0.665) (90.02)
Fake SptMkt× Policy -0.0157 -0.0287 -0.0226 -0.0237 -1.854
(0.0272) (0.0218) (0.0272) (0.0361) (5.812)
Observations 2368 2368 2368 2368 2368
# of Clusters 104 104 104 104 104
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.903∗ 0.246 1.145∗∗ 1.387∗∗ 165.7∗
(0.486) (0.309) (0.559) (0.682) (90.11)
Fake SptMkt× Policy 0.00986 -0.00868 0.000540 -0.00267 2.597
(0.0295) (0.0244) (0.0298) (0.0414) (6.705)
Policy × LCC -0.0612∗∗∗ -0.0597∗∗∗ -0.0727∗∗∗ -0.0758∗∗∗ -11.93∗∗∗
(0.0203) (0.0206) (0.0229) (0.0294) (3.863)
Fake SptMkt× Policy × LCC -0.0595 -0.0446 -0.0543 -0.0482 -11.03
(0.0413) (0.0361) (0.0461) (0.0555) (8.291)
Observations 2368 2368 2368 2368 2368
# of Clusters 104 104 104 104 104
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.972 0.320 0.744 1.615∗ 197.6
(0.618) (0.521) (0.531) (0.947) (124.6)
Fake SptMkt× Policy -0.0312 -0.0294 -0.0360 -0.0460 -6.192
(0.0366) (0.0350) (0.0341) (0.0522) (7.654)
Policy × Subcontracting 0.0525∗∗ 0.0231 0.0613∗∗∗ 0.0714∗∗ 11.69∗∗
(0.0224) (0.0280) (0.0233) (0.0314) (4.614)
Fake SptMkt× Policy × Subcontracting 0.0484 0.0329 0.0376 0.0455 7.291
(0.0446) (0.0506) (0.0422) (0.0607) (9.693)
Observations 1559 1559 1559 1559 1559
# of Clusters 103 103 103 103 103
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results on the top and in the middle are from the sample of the variable matched group.
Results on the bottom are from the sample of the variable matched group, but nonsubcontracting carriers on subcontracting
routes are dropped.
Additional controls include merger dummies. Merging carriers are dropped during their merging process. IV are used for
HHI. IV Tests are passed.
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Table 1.11: Falsification Test: Fake Treatment Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.336 -0.550 0.280 -1.192 -69.75
(0.482) (0.476) (0.469) (0.805) (86.80)
SptMkt× FakePolicy 0.00266 -0.00775 -0.0188 0.0384 0.190
(0.0256) (0.0208) (0.0219) (0.0329) (4.772)
Observations 1672 1672 1672 1672 1672
# of Clusters 130 130 130 130 130
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.284 -0.597 0.328 -0.672 -56.37
(0.466) (0.477) (0.473) (0.660) (82.70)
SptMkt× FakePolicy 0.0206 -0.0344 -0.0132 0.0810 3.472
(0.0458) (0.0322) (0.0373) (0.0540) (8.678)
FakePolicy × LCC -0.00452 -0.0406∗∗∗ -0.0159 0.0149 -2.595
(0.00984) (0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0137) (1.697)
SptMkt× FakePolicy × LCC -0.0305 0.0587 -0.00625 -0.0927 -5.191
(0.0531) (0.0457) (0.0458) (0.0594) (9.790)
Observations 1672 1672 1672 1672 1672
# of Clusters 130 130 130 130 130
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.270 -0.824 0.238 -1.042 -57.59
(0.410) (0.573) (0.352) (0.946) (76.33)
SptMkt× FakePolicy -0.00704 0.0177 -0.0207 0.0193 -1.900
(0.0241) (0.0277) (0.0207) (0.0355) (4.456)
FakePolicy × Subcontracting 0.0223 0.0575∗∗∗ 0.00972 0.00834 5.224∗
(0.0144) (0.0166) (0.0151) (0.0200) (2.728)
SptMkt× FakePolicy × Subcontracting 0.0395 -0.0514 -0.00358 0.0227 8.612
(0.0553) (0.0592) (0.0613) (0.0584) (10.44)
Observations 1143 1143 1143 1143 1143
# of Clusters 121 121 121 121 121
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results on the top and in the middle are from the sample of the treated and the variable matched groups in the periods
before Spirit’s baggage fee.
Results on the bottom are from the same sample, but nonsubcontracting carriers on subcontracting routes are dropped.
Additional controls include merger dummies. Merging carriers are dropped during their merging process. IV are used
for HHI. IV tests are passed.
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Table 1.12: Robustness Check: Future Entry Markets as Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.368 0.418 -0.300 -0.960 -112.0
(0.446) (0.410) (0.424) (0.632) (92.55)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0947∗∗∗ -0.0638∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -18.32∗∗∗
(0.0198) (0.0353) (0.0241) (0.0315) (4.412)
Observations 1445 1445 1445 1445 1445
# of Clusters 90 90 90 90 90
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.447 0.286 -0.353 -1.094 -128.5
(0.488) (0.406) (0.463) (0.710) (98.19)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0923∗∗∗ -0.0683∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -18.07∗∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0345) (0.0274) (0.0351) (4.905)
Policy × LCC -0.0249 -0.117∗∗∗ -0.00763 0.0108 -6.847
(0.0561) (0.0444) (0.0689) (0.0728) (14.59)
SptMkt× Policy × LCC -0.0109 0.0967∗ -0.0216 -0.0997 0.783
(0.0828) (0.0566) (0.0937) (0.120) (18.68)
Observations 1445 1445 1445 1445 1445
# of Clusters 90 90 90 90 90
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI -0.237 -0.228 -0.00813 -0.393 -22.59
(0.297) (0.189) (0.343) (0.397) (65.35)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0670∗∗ -0.0288 -0.0751∗∗ -0.0755∗∗ -14.96∗∗
(0.0265) (0.0295) (0.0312) (0.0383) (6.460)
Policy × Subcontracting 0.0253 0.0739∗∗ 0.0209 0.0159 1.145
(0.0315) (0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0344) (6.772)
SptMkt× Policy × Subcontracting -0.118∗∗ -0.160∗∗ -0.0901∗ -0.142∗ -16.74
(0.0529) (0.0650) (0.0518) (0.0726) (10.57)
Observations 1130 1130 1130 1130 1130
# of Clusters 89 89 89 89 89
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results on the top and in the middle are from the sample of the treated and the future matched groups.
Results on the bottom are from the sample of the treated and the future matched groups, but nonsubcontracting
carriers on subcontracting routes are dropped.
Additional controls include merger dummies. Merging carriers are dropped during their merging process. IV are
used for HHI. IV tests are passed.
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Table 1.13: Robustness Check: Use Whole Control Group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.281∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.269∗∗ 0.214 61.33∗∗
(0.0966) (0.109) (0.112) (0.174) (28.69)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0294 -0.0390∗∗ -0.0580∗∗∗ -0.0162 -7.161
(0.0226) (0.0175) (0.0224) (0.0325) (4.600)
Observations 17723 17723 17723 17723 17723
# of Clusters 938 938 938 938 938
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.383∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗ 65.65∗∗∗
(0.0989) (0.108) (0.110) (0.131) (22.39)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0309 -0.0427∗∗ -0.0608∗∗ -0.0122 -8.053
(0.0284) (0.0204) (0.0282) (0.0424) (5.584)
Policy × LCC -0.0368∗∗∗ -0.0510∗∗∗ -0.0471∗∗∗ -0.0464∗∗∗ -10.66∗∗∗
(0.00693) (0.00846) (0.00752) (0.00845) (1.386)
SptMkt× Policy × LCC 0.00472 0.0107 0.00952 -0.0185 3.105
(0.0391) (0.0262) (0.0401) (0.0578) (8.241)
Observations 17723 17723 17723 17723 17723
# of Clusters 938 938 938 938 938
LnFare LnFare20 LnFare50 LnFare80 Fare
HHI 0.183 0.314∗∗∗ 0.0464 0.250 104.7∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.0838) (0.123) (0.161) (22.58)
SptMkt× Policy -0.0196 -0.0263 -0.0491∗∗ -0.000173 -5.351
(0.0219) (0.0169) (0.0211) (0.0354) (4.439)
Policy × Subcontracting 0.00372 -0.0107 0.00526 0.0164 -0.0397
(0.00986) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0121) (2.365)
SptMkt× Policy × Subcontracting -0.0659∗ -0.0472 -0.0614∗∗ -0.0844 -10.33
(0.0342) (0.0365) (0.0255) (0.0593) (7.759)
Observations 12286 12286 12286 12286 12286
# of Clusters 933 933 933 933 933
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier-Route Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard error in parentheses is robust and clusted at route level. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results on the top and in the middle are from the sample of the treated and the whole control groups.
Results on the bottom are from the sample of the treated and the whole control groups, but nonsubcontracting
carriers on subcontracting routes are dropped.
Additional controls include merger dummies. Merging carriers are dropped during their merging process. IV are
used for HHI. IV tests are passed.
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Chapter 2 Tables
Table 2.1: Carriers List
Network Carriers
Major Carriers Alaska American Delta US Airways United
Low-cost Carriers
AirTran Allegiant Frontier Hawaiian JetBlue
Southwest Spirit Sun Country Virgin America
Regional Carriers
Air Wisconsin Cape Air Chautauqua CommutAir Compass Endeavor
Envoy ExpressJet GoJet Great Lakes Horizon Mesa
Mokulele PSA Pacific Wings Peninsula Piedmont Republic
Shuttle America Silver SkyWest Trans States
Notes: The table lists the names of the carriers by commonly known types in our sample.
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Table 2.3: A Possible Link Matrix on a Route in a Period
Subcontracting
Regional 1 Regional 2 Regional 3
Major 1 0 0 0
Major 2 0 1 0
Major 3 1 1 0
Non-Subcontracting: Regional Carriers
Self-Service “Other-Type”
Regional 1 0 1
Regional 2 0 0
Regional 3 0 0
Non-Subcontracting: Major Carriers
Self-Service Subsidiary Code-Sharing “Other-Type”
Major 1 0 0 0 0
Major 2 0 1 1 0
Major 3 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table shows a possible Linkmt in the case of 3 major and 3 regional carriers on
route m in the end of period t.
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Table 2.4: Subcontracting Partnerships among Airline Carriers in the Third Quarter of
2014 from RAA annual reports
Major Carrier Regional Carrier
Alaska
Horizon
SkyWest
American
Envoy
Chautauqua
ExpressJet
Republic
SkyWest
Delta
Chautauqua
Compass
Endeavor
ExpressJet
GoJet
Shuttle America
SkyWest
Major Carrier Regional Carrier
United
Cape Air
CommutAir
ExpressJet
GoJet
Mesa
Republic
Shuttle America
SkyWest
Trans States
US Airways
Air Wisconsin
Mesa
Piedmont
PSA
Republic
SkyWest
Trans States
Notes: The table shows the subcontracting partnerships among US airline carriers in the third
quarter of 2014. The regional carriers in bold are the wholly-owned subsidiaries.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics
Ob Mean SD Min Max
RouteDistancem 3889 848.983 471.400 30.000 1999.000
Precipitationm (in inch) 3889 43.500 12.706 4.830 70.970
SnowFallm (in inch) 3889 31.398 27.409 0.000 207.700
CarrierNmbrmt 66113 1.117 1.063 0.000 9.000
TopCarrierMktShmt 66113 0.660 0.433 0.000 1.000
LCCmt 66113 0.411 0.492 0.000 1.000
LargerPopmt (in million) 66113 5.949 5.110 0.030 20.321
SmallerPopmt (in million) 66113 1.248 1.421 0.024 9.561
Disparitymt 66113 15.720 40.671 1.000 849.553
LargerIncmt (in thousand dollar) 66113 55.620 12.284 30.331 169.296
SmallerIncmt (in thousand dollar) 66113 44.746 6.330 23.564 91.459
Larger(Emp/Pop)mt 66113 0.656 0.066 0.456 1.523
Smaller(Emp/Pop)mt 66113 0.585 0.057 0.385 1.046
MajorNmbrmt 66113 0.632 0.846 0.000 5.000
RegionalNmbrmt 66113 0.556 1.039 0.000 8.000
LinkNmbrmt 66113 0.598 1.156 0.000 13.000
SelfServiceMajorNmbrmt 66113 0.417 0.675 0.000 5.000
SubsidiaryMajorNmbrmt 66113 0.181 0.416 0.000 3.000
CodeSharingMajorNmbrmt 66113 0.051 0.250 0.000 3.000
OtherRelationMajorNmbrmt 66113 0.042 0.221 0.000 3.000
SelfServiceRegionalNmbrmt 66113 0.005 0.071 0.000 2.000
OtherRelationRegionalNmbrmt 66113 0.015 0.134 0.000 3.000
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics of variables at various levels.
SelfServiceMajorNmbrmt, SubsidiaryMajorNmbrmt, CodeSharingMajorNmbrmt, and
OtherRelationMajorNmbrmt are the numbers of major carriers which operate their own flights,
which use wholly-owned subsidiaries, which codeshare with other carriers, and which have
“other-type” of relationships on route m in period t. SelfServiceRegionalNmbrmt and
OtherRelationRegionalNmbrmt are the numbers of regional carriers which sell their own flight
tickets, and which have “other-type” relationships on route m in period t.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics (Continued)
Ob Mean SD Min Max
CommonRtNmbrijt 1234 45.662 68.021 0.000 347.000
MetricDistanceijt 1234 0.271 0.279 0.056 1.011
SameLinkNmbrijt 1234 32.016 64.465 0.000 338.000
RouteNmbrit 76 549.355 208.905 167.000 778.000
PassengerNmbrit(in million) 76 2.055 1.062 0.368 3.652
HubCentralityit 76 0.224 0.191 0.011 0.530
RouteNmbrjt 275 133.742 162.812 0.000 598.000
PassengerNmbrjt(in million) 275 0.133 0.187 0.000 0.804
AuthCentralityjt 275 0.062 0.085 0.000 0.324
PassengerNmbrimt (in thousand) 295564 0.528 2.327 0.000 47.203
MarketShareimt 295564 0.101 0.287 0.000 1.000
HubCentralityimt 295564 0.069 0.244 0.000 1.000
PassengerNmbrjmt (in thousand) 1069475 0.034 0.279 0.000 13.948
MarketSharejmt 1069475 0.019 0.124 0.000 1.000
AuthCentralityjmt 1069475 0.019 0.117 0.000 1.000
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics of variables at various levels.
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Table 2.6: Estimation Results
All Route-Serving
Major Carriers Major Carriers
Major Regional Major Regional
TempLinkV art
RivalLinkimt 0.1715
∗∗∗ 0.2854∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
RivalLinkjmt −0.1485∗∗∗ −0.0689∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
OtherLinkiijmt 0.4921
∗∗∗ −0.4838∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
OtherLinkjijmt 1.1150
∗∗∗ 0.5715∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
SelfServiceimt 0.9483
∗∗∗ 0.1801∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
SelfServicejmt 2.8657
∗∗∗ 2.6086∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Subsidiaryimt 0.9181
∗∗∗ 0.8883∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
CodeSharingimt 0.9646
∗∗∗ −0.8283∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
OtherTypeimt 2.0284
∗∗∗ −1.6170∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
OtherTypejmt 2.0255
∗∗∗ 4.3853∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
The probability that the parameter has the opposite sign of its mean is shown in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
119
Table 2.6: Estimation Results (Continued)
All Route-Serving
Major Carriers Major Carriers
Major Regional Major Regional
Homophily
CommonRtNmbrij,t−1 2.2838∗∗∗ 3.2724∗∗∗ 4.2310∗∗∗ 2.5675∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MetricDistanceij,t−1 −4.0549∗∗∗ −3.3231∗∗∗ −2.5717∗∗∗ −2.1117∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LinkV art−1
HubCentralityi,t−1 −0.1470 −3.1514∗∗∗ −1.1153∗∗∗ −0.1896∗
(0.302) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060)
AuthCentralityj,t−1 −1.2224∗∗∗ −3.4065∗∗∗ −1.5977∗∗∗ −1.4703∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HubCentralityim,t−1 −0.7067∗∗∗ 1.7271∗∗∗ 0.1806∗∗∗ 0.4281∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
AuthCentralityjm,t−1 −0.8645∗∗∗ −1.2463∗∗∗ 2.4365∗∗∗ −2.1384∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SameLinkNmbrij,t−1 3.9662∗∗∗ 4.9195∗∗∗ 6.8258∗∗∗ 3.7593∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Linkijm,t−1 3.7702∗∗∗ 4.8694∗∗∗ 7.1305∗∗∗ 3.0936∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Carrier Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Carrier Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Route Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
The probability that the parameter has the opposite sign of its mean is shown in parentheses.
∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Carrier characteristics and route characteristics are listed and
explained as in Table A2.2. Estimates of these covariates are available upon request.
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Table 2.7: Summary Statistics: Ticket Prices
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Distancem 67056 831.7 463.1 54 1999
Fareimt 67056 196.0 74.52 10 931.9
HHImt 67056 0.776 0.255 0.191 1
LCCmt 67056 0.637 0.481 0 1
Subcontractingmt 67056 0.474 0.499 0 1
IVmt 67056 0.465 0.457 0.000797 1
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics in the sample of ticket price regressions.
Table 2.8: The Impact of Subcontracting on Ticket Prices
(1) (2)
log(fare)imt log(fare)imt
HHImt 0.160
∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.0153) (0.0155)
Subcontractingmt -0.00501 -0.0336
∗∗
(0.00545) (0.0140)
LCCmt -0.0357
∗∗∗ -0.0364∗∗∗
(0.00860) (0.00861)
Observations 67056 66175
IV for Subcontracting No Yes
IV test Passed Yes
# of Clusters 3830 3566
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Route-Carrier fixed effects and time fixed effects are controlled for. No IV is used in the
first column. In the second column, IV is used for Subcontractingmt. Standard error is robust
and clustered at route level.
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Chapter 3 Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Distance 931.750 651.324 68.000 4963.000
CarrierPassenger 809.319 872.132 90.000 11532.000
MktPassenger 1678.494 1979.611 90.000 17756.000
HHI 0.703 0.252 0.196 1.000
FareMean 193.859 75.227 21.008 1166.279
FareSD 81.808 43.893 3.432 521.525
Skewness 0.574 0.580 -3.009 4.653
BaggageFee 0.002 0.041 0.000 1.000
Observations 104112
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Table 3.2: Panel Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Skewness Skewness Skewness Skewness Skewness
HHI 0.638∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.213 0.439 0.282∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0963) (0.144) (0.396) (0.0778)
TimeTrend 0.00192∗∗∗ -0.00897∗∗∗ -0.00425∗∗ -0.00621∗∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗
(0.000118) (0.000839) (0.00208) (0.00226) (0.000691)
BFCarrier × TimeTrend -0.0106∗∗∗
(0.000846)
Observations 104112 4247 872 1344 2031
Carrier-Market Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seasonal Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample ALL BF Carriers Spirit Allegiant Frontier
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.3: Survival Test
(1) (2) (3)
BaggageFee BaggageFee BaggageFee
SkewnessMean -0.00324 -0.00202 -0.00190
(0.0960) (0.0936) (0.0933)
SkewnessDev -0.186∗ -0.238∗ -0.176∗
(0.0991) (0.131) (0.0952)
HHIMean 0.0565 0.0534 0.0588
(0.186) (0.181) (0.181)
HHIDev -0.0842 -0.169 -0.0716
(0.320) (0.363) (0.309)
Constant 5.398∗∗∗ 5.446∗∗∗ 5.503∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.185) (0.190)
logs
Constant -1.192∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ -0.756∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.0648) (0.135)
sigma2 u
Constant 0.980∗∗∗ 3.55e-29 0.996∗∗∗
(0.180) (8.26e-15) (0.172)
Observations 104112 104112 104112
Method loglogistic lognormal gamma
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix
Chapter 1 Appendix
A1.1 Data Filter
We discuss how we construct our sample in this appendix. The main data set we use is
the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) data, a 10% quarterly sample of airline
tickets sold to passengers. It contains three different data sets: Coupon data, Market data,
and Ticket data, and we use variables from all three data sets. Ticket data is at the itinerary
level, and we use the variables roundtrip and dollarcred from this data.18 roundtrip indicates
whether the itinerary is round trip or one-way, and dollarcred indicates whether the ticket
price is reliable. We drop observations whose ticket price is unreliable. Market data is at the
directional market level and is the main data set we use. Variables we use from Market data
include year, quarter, origin airport, destination airport, ticketing carrier, operating carrier,
passenger numbers, market fare in dollars, market distance in miles, and market geography
type. The last variable allows us to identify and use only the tickets of flights within the
18If a passenger travels from A to B with a connecting point at C, and then travels back from B to A
with a connecting point at D, the whole trip A → C → B → D → A is an itinerary. An itinerary can be
one-way or round trip, and can include non-stop flights and/or connecting flights.
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lower 48 states in the US. Ticket data is at the segment level.19 The variable we use from
Ticket data is fare class, which identifies passengers’ service class level (e.g., economy class).
We only use tickets of non-stop flights according to our market definition: directional
non-stop route. It includes one-way non-stop flights and roundtrip flights with both way
non-stop. In order to address the issue of “double counting”, we drop the return portions
of roundtrip flights. For legacy ticketing carriers, we only use tickets of economy class.
We do so because Spirit Airlines is an Ultra-Low-Cost Carrier, and mainly competes with
legacy carriers for their economy class passengers. Following the literature, we drop all
tickets with prices less than $10, which are generally considered as frequent-flyer tickets. We
also drop the tickets with highest 2% prices for a ticketing carrier on a route in a quarter
for concern of coding error when the data were entered. Subcontracting occurs when a
major carrier subcontracts its service to a regional carrier.20 For each carrier-route-quarter
(ijt), we observe whether the carrier subcontracts its service. We then construct a variable
Subcontractingij (at the carrier-route level) which takes value 1 if carrier i subcontracts
its operations to a regional carrier on route j for over 25% of all its pre-treatment periods
(before Spirit charges for carry-on baggage). Note that a major carrier may also have its own
subsidiary operating the flights. We do not consider this case as subcontracting, because the
ticketing and regional carriers in this case have the same owner. In the end we aggregate the
data to carrier-route-quarter level, and calculate average, 20 percentile, 50 percentile, and
19Segments are routes, which compose a market. A segment can be a part of a market or a market itself.
For example, the itinerary A→ C → B → D → A contains four segments.
20A major carrier in our sample can either be a legacy carrier like American Airlines or a low-cost carrier
like Southwest Airlines. We identify airlines’ subcontracting relationships using the information provided by
the Regional Airline Association Annual Reports.
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80 percentile ticket prices, and passenger numbers. From passenger numbers, we calculate
market share for each carrier on a route in a quarter, and then HHI as well.
After aggregating the data, we drop the observation (carrier-route-quarter cell) if its
passenger number is smaller than 5. As we are more interested in the response of large
ticketing carriers, we drop all small or regional ticketing carriers. In our treatment group
there must be at least one carrier competing with Spirit so that we can tell the competing
carriers’ response to Spirit’s policy change, so in our control group it is not appropriate
to have some routes where a monopolist serves without any competition. As a result, we
eliminate all the routes whose HHI is equal to 1 in the quarter. Alaska Airline and Virgin
American began to charge $15 first checked baggage fee on July 7th and May 5th in 2009
separately, which are in the middle of our sample periods. So we eliminate all the routes
in which Alaska and Virgin American operate to avoid complication to our identification.
We then merge Metropolitan and Micropolitan statistical areas population estimation data
into our main data set. Some airports need to be matched manually to the corresponding
metropolitan or micropolitan statistical areas. Matching between the MSA data and the
DB1B data is imperfect – a few small airports cannot be matched and have to be dropped
from the sample.
Last, we discuss how enplanement is approximated in this paper. Instead of obtaining
enplanement information from T-100 segment data, we approximate it from DB1B Coupon
data. By aggregating passenger numbers of each segment in each quarter, we can get how
many passengers each ticketing carrier delivers from one airport directly to another airport.
This number is no smaller than the passenger number in each market we derived above,
because these two airports are not necessarily passengers’ origin airport or destination airport
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in Coupon data, and the segment can be one of the passengers’ connecting flights. This is
exactly what we need as enplanement, the only difference is that the enplanement from
Coupon data is a 10% survey instead of the actual enplanement.
A1.2 Merger Dummies
The following merger dummies are defined at the route level, and thus route specific.
Merged is equal to 1 if two carriers finish merging in the quarter on the route, and equal
to 0 otherwise.
Merged Leadn is equal to 1 in the nth quarter before two carriers finish merging on the
route, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Merged Lagn is equal to 1 in the nth quarter after two carriers finish merging on the
route, and equal to 0 otherwise.
For the variables above, we divide the routes into 4 groups as follows:
 Both merging carriers operate before but one operates after the merger.
 Both merging carriers operate before but none operates after the merger.
 Only one merging carrier operates before and one operates after the merger.
 Only one merging carrier operates before but none operates after the merger.
MgrAnn is equal to 1 in the quarter when two carriers announce their merger decisions
on the route where at least one of them operate.
Merger is equal to 1 in the quarter when the merger is approved and two carriers begin
to merge and on the route where at least one of them operate.
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MgrAnn Leads, MgrAnn Lags, and Merger Lags are defined in the same way as
Merged Leads and Merged Lags.
For the variables above, we also divide them into 2 groups:
 the route where both merging carriers operate.
 the route where only one merging carrier operates.
A1.3 Instrumental Variables for HHI
We have 7 IVs in total. Six of them are used and described in Gerardi and Shapiro (2009):
lndisj: The logarithm of nonstop distance in miles between endpoint airports.
ameanpopjt: The arithmetic mean of the metropolitan and micropolitan population
21 of
endpoint cities in each year.
gmeanpopjt: The geometric mean of the metropolitan and micropolitan population of
endpoint cities in each year.
lnpassrtejt: The logarithm of total enplanement on route j in period t.
22
GENSP :
√
ENPj1 ∗
√
ENPj2/
∑√
ENPk1 ∗ ENPk2, where k indexes all carriers, j is
the observed carrier, and ENPk1 and ENPk2 are carrier k’s average quarterly enplanements
at the two endpoint airports.
21Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) use 2000 census data. We use annual population estimation.
22Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) drop the observations that ticketing carrier is not the same as operating
carrier from DB1B data when they match DB1B with T-100 Data which provides enplanement. In order
to avoid droping observations, we use DB1B Coupon data to approximate enplanement rather than using
T-100 data. So the enplanement numbers across markets in our paper are a little different from those in
their paper. Please see Section 2.4 Data and Variable, and Appendix A for more details.
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IRUTHERF : ˆMKTSHARE
2
ijt +
HHIjt−MKTSHARE2ijt
(1−MKTSHAREijt)2 ∗ (1 − ˆMKTSHAREijt)2.
ˆMKTSHAREijt is the fitted value for MKTSHAREijt from its first-stage regression.
Besides theirs, another IV we use is Other Enplanement:√
(
∑
TENPkj1 − TENPij1) ∗ (
∑
TENPkj2 − TENPij2), where k indexes all carriers,
i is the observed carrier, and j indexes route. TENPkj1 and TENPkj2 are carrier k’s total
quarterly enplanements at the two endpoint airports.
Chapter 2 Appendix
A2.1 An Example of a Potential Event Order with 3 Major and
3 Regional Airlines
Table A2.1 presents an example of a potential event order in the case of 3 major and 3 regional
carriers at period t. Event 1 to 9 listed in the table are the meetings between major carriers
and regional carriers. For example, Event 1 allows Major carrier 1 and Regional carrier 1 to
meet and decide whether to maintain or establish subcontracting relationships and if so on
which routes. In Event 10 to 21, major carriers decide whether to form non-subcontracting
relationships and if so on which routes.23 Similarly, Event 22 to 27 provide the opportunities
for each independent regional carrier to make their non-subcontracting decisions. The last
event, Event 28, allows low-cost carriers to make their route entry decisions.
23In this paper, we focus on the formation of a subcontracting network instead of non-subcontracting, so
we do not model what factors affect carriers’ non-subcontracting relationships. For simplicity, we aggregate
carriers’ non-subcontracting decisions rather than allowing them to meet with each carrier separately.
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A2.2 Estimating Parameters
In this section, we elaborate on the estimation of β and event order. We use the Markov-
Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) method to update the estimates of the parameters and get a
converged posterior distribution after a large number of iterations. We assume β contains
N parameters and follows a prior normal distribution N(0, IN), where IN is the identity
matrix, and β0 = 0. Letting q denote the iteration number and n index the element in β,
we update β from βnq to β
n
q+1 as follows. We first randomly draw a β
n from N(βnq , 1). We
then calculate the likelihood ratio
r = min{1, L(β
n|EOq, Link, β1q+1, ..., βn−1q+1 , βn+1q , ..., βNq )p(βn)
L(βnq |EOq, Link, β1q+1, ..., βn−1q+1 , βn+1q , ..., βNq )p(βnq )
}, (8)
where p is the density function of the standard normal distribution. Depending on the
likelihood ratio r, βnq+1 will be determined by the following equation,
βnq+1 =

βn with probability r
βnq with probability 1− r.
(9)
Besides updating β, we update EO from EOq to EOq+1 using the same MCMC method
to get a converged posterior distribution. We assume EO follows a uniform distribution over
EventOrder, the set of all possible EOs. We first draw an EOtemp from the distribution,
and calculate the likelihood ratio,
r = min{1, L(βq+1|EO
temp, Link)
L(βq+1|EOq, Link) }. (10)
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Depending on the likelihood ratio, we decide whether to update the event order according
to the following equation,
EOq+1 =

EOtemp with probability r
EOq with probability 1− r.
(11)
A2.3 Data Filtering and Variable Constructing
We first discuss how we identify the five types of relationships among airline carriers: Self-
service, Subsidiary, Subcontracting, Code-sharing, and Other-Type. DB1B Coupon Data
directly provides information about ticketing carrier and operating carrier so we can dis-
tinguish self-service, code-sharing and relationships between major carriers and regional
carriers.24 Next, we identify relationships between major carriers and regional carriers (Sub-
sidiary, Subcontracting, and “Other-Type”) as follows. We first collect the information about
major carriers’ wholly-owned subsidiaries. We then use RAA annual reports to distinguish
subcontracting relationship from “other types” of relationships. Unfortunately, RAA only
provides information for the third quarter each year. For the remaining quarters, we have
to extrapolate carriers’ subcontracting relationships based upon the available information.25
24The same ticketing and operating carrier implies self-service. If the ticketing carrier and the operating
carriers are different network carriers, the observation indicates a code-sharing relationship. If the ticketing
carrier is a major carrier and the operating carrier is a regional carrier, it represents one of the relationships
between major carriers and regional carriers.
25For example, if Major carrier 1 does not subcontract to Regional carrier 1 in quarter 3 of 2015, but
subcontracts to it in quarter 3 of 2016, and if we observe that Major carrier 1 is the ticketing carrier
and Regional carrier 1 is the operating carrier on some routes in quarter 2 of 2016, we consider that they
have formed a subcontracting relationship in this quarter. As airline carriers’ subcontracting partnerships
are typically formed with long-term contracts and are relatively stable over time without frequent changes
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Following the literature, we only keep the largest 300 airports in terms of passenger num-
bers in the lower 48 U.S. states26. We drop the routes with distance more than 2000 miles,
since regional carriers equipped with regional aircrafts are not able to provide flight service
on a route with such a long distance. After aggregate the data into route-quarter-ticketing
carrier-operating carrier level, we drop the observation if it has less than 20 passengers. Since
we focus on the subcontracting relationships between major carriers and regional carriers, we
do not consider directly the behaviors of ticketing carriers which are not major carriers. In
addition, wholly-owned subsidiaries do not have any subcontracting relationship with other
major carriers, thus we do not consider subsidiaries as candidate regional carriers that are
entering subcontracting agreements with major carriers. We construct our variables accord-
ing to Table A2.2. In order to construct some route level covariates, we also use information
regarding population, income and employment in the metropolitan and micropolitan statis-
tical areas provided by Bureau of Economic Analysis. In addition, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration provides the average level of precipitation and snowfall across
years.
within a short time, we consider this as a reasonable extrapolation.
26The passenger numbers used to rank the airports are calculated using 2015 first quarter DB1B Coupon
Data.
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Chapter 3 Appendix
A3.1 Data Clean and Filter
I clean and filter the data in a similar way as we do in He, Kim and Liu (2019). DB1B
includes three data sets: Ticket data, Market data and Coupon data. All data sets are used
to construct the sample. Since a market is defined as a directional non-stop airport to airport
route, only non-stop airline tickets are kept, including one-way non-stop tickets and round-
trip tickets with each way non-stop. In order to address the issue of “double counting”,
I drop the return portions of roundtrip tickets. The observations with prices that are not
reliable are dropped, indicated by the variable dollarcred. First and business class tickets
are dropped for legacy carriers, since the carry-on baggage fee carriers in the sample are
all low-cost carriers, and economy class passengers of legacy carriers are better comparison
groups. Ticket prices less than $10 and at the top 2% are dropped. Then I aggregate the
data to carrier-market-quarter level, calculating carrier fare mean, standard deviation and
skewness. Using passenger numbers, I calculate carriers’ market shares and HHI. I also
drop the observations with less than 90 passengers or zero price standard deviation so that
price distribution can be measured with precision. I only keep the markets in which at least
one carrier operated during each period. I drop the observations for carry-on baggage fee
carriers after they charge the fee and the routes on which they enter after their adoption of
the fee.
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Appendix Figures
Figure A2.1: Parameter Posterior Distributions: The Effect on the Probability of Major
Carriers’ Route Entry in Subcontracting Services with a Regional Carrier
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Figure A2.2: Parameter Posterior Distributions: The Effect on the Probability of Regional
Carriers’ Link Formation with All Potential Major Carriers
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Figure A2.3: Parameter Posterior Distributions: The Effect on the Probability of
Route-Serving Major Carriers’ Link Formation
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Figure A2.4: Parameter Posterior Distributions: The Effect on the Probability of Regional
Carriers’ Link Formation with Route-Serving Major Carriers
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Appendix Tables
Table A2.1: A Possible Event Order at Period t
Event 1 Major 1 sub. Regional 1
Event 2 Major 1 sub. Regional 2
Event 3 Major 1 sub. Regional 3
Event 4 Major 2 sub. Regional 1
Event 5 Major 2 sub. Regional 2
Event 6 Major 2 sub. Regional 3
Event 7 Major 3 sub. Regional 1
Event 8 Major 3 sub. Regional 2
Event 9 Major 3 sub. Regional 3
Event 10 Major 1: Self-Service
Event 11 Major 1: Subsidiary
Event 12 Major 1: Code-Sharing
Event 13 Major 1: Other-Type
Event 14 Major 2: Self-Service
Event 15 Major 2: Subsidiary
Event 16 Major 2: Code-Sharing
Event 17 Major 2: Other-Type
Event 18 Major 3: Self-Service
Event 19 Major 3: Subsidiary
Event 20 Major 3: Code-Sharing
Event 21 Major 3: Other-Type
Event 22 Regional 1: Self-Service
Event 23 Regional 1: Other-Type
Event 24 Regional 2: Self-Service
Event 25 Regional 2: Other-Type
Event 26 Regional 3: Self-Service
Event 27 Regional 3: Other-Type
Event 28 Low-Cost Carriers: Entry
Notes: The table shows a possible event order in the case of 3 major and 3 regional carriers in
period t. In each event, carriers make their corresponding decisions for all their possible routes.
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Table A2.2: Variables
Variable Explanation
TempLinkV art, variables generated from transition networks
RivalLinkimt/
RivalLinkjmt
A dummy variable indicating whether the rivals of Major Carrier
i/ Regional Carrier j has subcontracting relationships (links) with
other carriers on route m at period t when the carrier is making
subcontracting decision.
OtherLinkiijmt/
OtherLinkjijmt
A dumy variable indicating whether Major Carrier i/ Regional
Carrier j has subcontracting relationships with other carriers
rather than Regional Carrier j/ Major Carrier i on route m at
period t when i and j are making the subcontracting decisions.
SelfServiceimt A dummy variable indicating whether Major Carrier i flies its own
flights (serves itself) on route m at period t when it is making the
subcontracting decisions.
SelfServicejmt A dummy variable indicating whether Regional Carrier j sched-
ules its own flights and sells its own tickets (serves itself) on route
m at period t when it is making the subcontracting decisions.
Subsidiaryimt A dummy variable indicating whether Major Carrier i uses its
wholly owned subsidiaries on route m at period t when it is mak-
ing the subcontracting decisions.
CodeSharingimt A dummy variable indicating whether Major carrier i codeshares
with other carriers on route m at period t when it is making the
subcontracting decisions.
OtherTypeimt/
OtherTypejmt
A dummy variable indicating whether Major Carrier i/ Regional
Carrier j has “other-type” of relationships on route m at period
t when it is making the subcontracting decisions.
Notes: The table explains the variables included in the estimations.
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Table A2.2: Variables (Continued)
Variable Explanation
LinkV art−1, variables generated from networks in the last period
HubCentralityi,t−1/
HubCentralityim,t−1
Hub Centrality: a centrality measurement in [0, 1], capturing the
relative importance of Major Carrier i compared to other major
carriers. It not only captures how many carriers Major Carrier i
connects to, but also considers the importance of those carriers
being connected to. It is calcualted at both carrier and route-
carrier level.
AuthCentralityj,t−1/
AuthCentralityjm,t−1
Authority Centrality: a centrality measurement in [0, 1], captur-
ing the relative importance of Regional Carrier j compared to
other regional carriers. It not only captures how many carriers
Regional Carrier j connects to, but also considers the importance
of those carriers being connected to. It is calcualted at both car-
rier and route-carrier level.
SameLinkNmbrij,t−1 The number of the same links Major Carrier i and Regional Car-
rier j form at period t− 1.
Linkijm,t−1 A dummy indicating whether Major Carrier i and Regional Car-
rier j forms a link on route m at period t− 1.
Notes: The table explains the variables included in the estimations.
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Table A2.2: Variables (Continued)
Variable Explanation
Homophily, the similarity between two carriers
CommonRtNmbrij,t−1 The number of common routes on which Major Carrier i and
Regional Carrier j serve at period t− 1.
MetricDistanceij,t−1 The metric distance between the two vectors of Major Car-
rier i’s and Regional Carrier j’s passenger shares across
routes at period t − 1. The smaller it is, the more
similar these two carriers are. MetricDistanceij,t−1 =√∑
m∈{1,...,M}(
passengerim,t−1
passengeri,t−1
− passengerjm,t−1
passengerj,t−1
)2
CarrierChar, carrier characteristics
RouteNmbri,t−1/
RouteNmbrj,t−1
The number of routes on which Major Carrier i/ Regional Carrier
j serves at period t− 1.
PassengerNmbri,t−1/
PassengerNmbrj,t−1
The number of passengers Major Carrier i/ Regional Carrier j
serves at period t− 1.
PassengerNmbrim,t−1/
PassengerNmbrjm,t−1
The number of passengers Major Carrier i/ Regional Carrier j
serves on route m at period t− 1.
MarketShareim,t−1 The percentage of tickets sold by Major Carrier i out of all tickets
on route m at period t− 1.
MarketSharejm,t−1 The percentage of passengers delivered by Regional Carrier j out
of all passengers on route m at period t− 1.
Notes: The table explains the variables included in the estimations.
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Table A2.2: Variables (Continued)
Variable Explanation
RouteChar, route characteristics
RouteDistancem Route distance.
Precipitationm The maximum of the average annual precipitation between 1981
and 2010 at the two airports of route m.
SnowFallm The maximum of the average annual snow fall between 1981 and
2010 at the two airports of route m.
CarrierNmbrm,t−1 The number of ticketing carriers on route m at period t− 1.
TopCarrierMktShm,t−1 The percentage of the tickets sold by the largest ticketing carrier
out of all tickets sold on route m at period t− 1.
LCCmt A dummy variable indicating whether there is a low-cost ticket-
ing carrier on route m at period t.
log(gmean(pop))mt The logarithm of the geometric mean of the populations around
the two airports of route m at period t.
Disparitymt The ratio of the larger population and the smaller population
around the two airports of route m at period t. It captures the
relative size of the two airports’ populations
log(gemean(inc))mt The logarithm of the geometric mean of the income per capita
around the two airports of route m at period t.
log(gemean(emp/pop))mtThe logarithm of the geometric mean of the employment popu-
lation ratio around the two airports of route m at period t.
Notes: The table explains the variables included in the estimations.
We use CarrierNmbrm,t−1 and TopCarrierMktShm,t−1 rather than Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
to measure market competition levels because HHI cannot be defined on a route during a period
when no carriers operate there.
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